Regulatory reform in telecommunications in Central and Eastern Europe

Armstrong, Mark; Vickers, John

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0351.1996.tb00174.x

Cited by 32 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…There is some degree of subjectivity in the index, given the literature includes ITU (1993), Tyler andBednarczyk (1993), Miller (1994), Schultz (1994), Sinha (1995), Tenenbaum (1996), Petrazzini (1997), Armstrong and Vickers (1996), Cave (1997), Melody (1997b), Stern and Holder (1999) and .…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Telecommunications liberalization and regulatory governance: lessons from Latin America

Gutiérrez

Berg²

2000

Telecommunications Policy

117

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confidence: 99%

Telecommunications liberalization and regulatory governance: lessons from Latin America

Gutiérrez

Berg²

2000

Telecommunications Policy

117

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“…26 It is interesting to consider this case since the largest part of the economic literature which analyzes existing industry structures has considered the total welfare standard (Farell and Katz, 2006). Also, a weighted sum of consumer surplus and …rms'gains, with a higher weight on the former than on the latter, (Armstrong et al, 1994) may represent an adequate objective for the legislator.…”

Section: Welfare Standard and Comparison Of Institutional Environmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Remedies vs. Extreme Options in Merger Control

Dertwinkel-Kalt

Wey

2014

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractWe investigate how remedies in merger control a¤ect information acquisition by an antitrust agency. We identify conditions under which an "extreme options" regime which does not allow for remedies improves information acquisition by the agency which increases consumer surplus. The legislator ("principal") and the agency share the same objective function with the only exception that the latter must bear information costs. When remedies are not feasible, then the agency's incentive to acquire information is relatively large as a false decision tends to have large adverse e¤ects. When remedies are feasible, the intermediate option does not involve such risks, so that incentives to acquire information decreases. However, our results depend crucially on the institutional environment. In the case of an adversial system, information acquisition incentives are not per se lower if remedies are feasible.We thank Lars Sorgard and Deszö Szalay for their helpful comments.

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“…In this paper we focus on the impact of concession length and investment ‡exibility on "concession value" leaving aside the problems arising from asymmetric information, and ignoring other public objectives 1 . In other words, we assume that the government wishes to maximize the value of the contract, in order to make it more appealing.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Concession Length and Investment Timing Flexibility

2005

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Concession Length and Investment Timing Flexibility SummaryWhen assigning a concession contract, the regulator faces the issue of setting the concession length. Another key issue is whether or not the concessionare should be allowed to set the timing of new investments. In this paper we investigate the impact of concession length and investment timing flexibility on the "concession value". It is generally argued that long-term contracts are privately valuable as they enable a concessionaire to increase her overall discounted returns. Moreover, the real option theory suggests that investment flexibility has an intrinsic value, as it allows concessionaires to avoid costly errors. By combining these two conventional wisdoms, one may argue that long-term contracts, which allow for investment timing flexibility, should always result in higher concession values. Our result suggests that this is not always the case. Firstly, investment flexibility does not always increase the concession value. Secondly, long-term contracts do not necessarily increase the concession value.

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Regulatory reform in telecommunications in Central and Eastern Europe

Cited by 32 publications

References 8 publications

Telecommunications liberalization and regulatory governance: lessons from Latin America

Telecommunications liberalization and regulatory governance: lessons from Latin America

Remedies vs. Extreme Options in Merger Control

Concession Length and Investment Timing Flexibility

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