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We examine the effect on economic growth of mobile cellular phones in sub-Saharan Africa where a marked asymmetry is present between land-line penetration and mobile telecommunications expansion. This study extends previous ones along two important dimensions. First, we allow for the potential endogeneity between economic growth and telecommunications expansion by employing a special linear generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator. Second, we explicitly model for varying degrees of substitutability between mobile cellular and land-line telephony, so that greater expansion of mobile telecommunications can have a different impact whenever the level of land-line penetration differs. We find that mobile cellular phone expansion is an important determinant of the rate of economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, we find that the contribution of mobile cellular phones to economic growth has been growing in importance in the region, and that the marginal impact of mobile telecommunication services is even greater wherever land-line phones are rare. Given the low cost of mobile telecommunications technology relative to other broad infrastructure projects, especially land-line infrastructure, we advocate that mobile telecommunication services be encouraged in the area. ♣ The findings, recommendation, interpretation and conclusion expressed in this paper are those of the authors and not necessarily reflects the view of the Department of Economics of the Universidad del Rosario

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Executive SummaryThe role of the state changed in Latin American and Caribbean countries between 1985 and

This study examines the structure of voting control and blockholders' contestability for a sample of 233 non-financial listed firms in Colombia during 1996Colombia during -2004. Corporate control is characterized by high ownership concentration and blockholder power, which implies low separation ratios between cash flow rights and voting rights. On average the separation ratios for the largest voting block is 0.95, while that for the fourth largest shareholder is 0.75. Corporate control is privately biased when there is direct monitoring of firm management by controlling owners. Regression results show that a more equal distribution of equity among large blockholders has a positive effect on firm value. Contestability matters most when firm shares are liquid and actively traded on the stock market. This finding is reinforced when the probability that the largest block can form a winning coalition decreases and performance variables, such as market to sales ratio and return on equity, are included in the estimating equations as substitutes for firm value. In addition, our estimations provide evidence that diversion of rents (tunneling) is limited by blockholders' contestability.