Competition and cooperation among different punishing strategies in the spatial public goods game

Chen, Xiaojie; Szolnoki, Attila; Perc, Matjaž

doi:10.1103/physreve.92.012819

Cited by 214 publications

(96 citation statements)

References 46 publications

(59 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Aspects particularly relevant to human cooperation have also been studied in much detail [14]. The workhorse behind this research has been the spatial public goods game [50,51], with extensions towards different forms of punishment [52][53][54][55][56][57][58], rewarding [59][60][61][62], and tolerance [63], to name just some examples. The Monte Carlo method is thereby typically used [64], which ensures that the research is aligned with statistical physics methodology.…”

Section: Statistical Physics Of Human Cooperationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Grand Challenges in Social Physics: In Pursuit of Moral Behavior

2018

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Methods of statistical physics have proven valuable for studying the evolution of cooperation in social dilemma games. However, recent empirical research shows that cooperative behavior in social dilemmas is only one kind of a more general class of behavior, namely moral behavior, which includes reciprocity, respecting others' property, honesty, equity, efficiency, as well as many others. Inspired by these experimental works, we here open up the path towards studying other forms of moral behavior with methods of statistical physics. We argue that this is a far-reaching direction for future research that can help us answer fundamental questions about human sociality. Why did our societies evolve as they did? What moral principles are more likely to emerge? What happens when different moral principles clash? Can we predict the break out of moral conflicts in advance and contribute to their solution? These are amongst the most important questions of our time, and methods of statistical physics could lead to new insights and contribute towards finding answers.

show abstract

Section: Statistical Physics Of Human Cooperationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Grand Challenges in Social Physics: In Pursuit of Moral Behavior

2018

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In particular, the public goods game has been recognized as a paradigm, which succinctly describes the essential dilemma of cooperation [2,6]. Recent works on the public goods game have proposed effective means to enable the evolution of cooperation, such as punishment [7][8][9][10][11][12][13], reward [14][15][16], exclusion [17][18][19][20], and individual migration [21].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Leaving bads provides better outcome than approaching goods in a social dilemma

2020

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Individual migration has been regarded as an important factor for the evolution of cooperation in mobile populations. Motivations of migration, however, can be largely divergent: one is highly frustrated by the vicinity of an exploiter or defector, while other enthusiastically searches cooperator mates. Albeit both extreme attitudes are observed in human behavior, but their specific impacts on wellbeing remained unexplored. In this work, we propose an orientation-driven migration approach for mobile individuals in combination with the mentioned migration preferences and study their roles in the cooperation level in a two-dimensional public goods game. We find that cooperation can be greatly promoted when individuals are more inclined to escape away from their defective neighbors. On the contrary, cooperation cannot be effectively maintained when individuals are more motivated to approach their cooperative neighbors. In addition, compared with random migration, movement by leaving defectors can promote cooperation more effectively. By means of theoretical analysis and numerical calculations, we further find that when individuals only choose to escape away from their defective neighbors, the average distance between cooperators and defectors can be enlarged, hence the natural invasion of defection can be efficiently blocked. Our work, thus, provides further insight on how different migration preferences influence the evolution of cooperation in the unified framework of spatially social games. such mode of migration leads to the outbreak of cooperation. On the other hand, Chen et al proposed riskdriven migration in the collective-risk social dilemma game on a square lattice and found that risk-driven migration dramatically enhances the evolution of public cooperation when individuals move away from unfavorable locations [41].It is worth pointing out that most of previous works consider random migration [28,40], success-driven migration [27], or risk-driven migration [41] separately. They do not consider the orientation-driven migration under which different migration preferences or migration modes are considered in a unified framework. Indeed individuals can adjust their moving orientation according to these preferred modes. By means of migration they can move away from unfavorable environment, pursuit the profitable circumstances, or choose other directions as they wish in realistic situations. However, it is still unclear how such orientation-driven migration influences the evolution of cooperation and which mode of individual migration can promote the evolution of cooperation more effectively.In this work, we thereby propose an orientation-driven migration into a population of mobile individuals playing the public goods game. We assume that individuals can choose the direction of mobility depending on the strategy types of their neighbors on a two-dimensional plane under such orientation-driven migration. Correspondingly, individuals can choose to escape from neighboring defectors or move to neighboring cooperato...

show abstract

“…In addition, the effect of the network structure on the evolution of cooperation was investigated in other networks, including random regular graphs [12], small world networks [13][14][15] and actual social networks [16][17][18]. Furthermore, the role of networks in resolving social dilemma was investigated in combination with other mechanisms, including voluntary participation [19,20], heterogeneous teaching activity [21][22][23], time scale for strategy updating [24][25][26], payoff aspiration [27][28][29], conformity [30][31][32] and punishment [33][34][35][36].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effects of updating rules on the coevolving prisoner’s dilemma

Takesue

2019

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We studied the effect of three strategy updating rules in coevolving prisoner's dilemma games where agents (nodes) can switch both the strategy and social partners. Under two node-based strategy updating rules, strategy updating occurs between a randomly chosen focal node and its randomly selected neighbour. The focal agent becomes the strategy recipient and may imitate the strategy of the neighbour according to the payoff difference, i.e. votermodel-like dynamics (VMLD), or becomes a strategy donor and thus may be imitated by the neighbour, i.e. invasion-process-like dynamics (IPLD). For edge-based updating rules, one edge is selected, and the roles of the two connected nodes (donor or recipient) are randomly decided, i.e. edge-based dynamics (EBD). A computer simulation shows that partner switching supports the evolution of cooperation under VMLD, which has been utilised in many studies on spatial evolutionary games, whereas cooperators often vanish under IPLD. The EBD results lie between these two processes. This difference is prominent among nodes with large degrees. In addition, partner switching induces a non-monotonic relationship between the fraction of cooperators and intensity of selection under VMLD and EBD, and a weak or strong selection supports cooperation. In contrast, only a strong selection supports cooperators under IPLD. Similar differences in the enhancement of cooperation are observed when games are played on static heterogeneous networks. Our results imply that the direction of imitation is quite important for understanding the evolutionary process of cooperation.

show abstract

Competition and cooperation among different punishing strategies in the spatial public goods game

Cited by 214 publications

References 46 publications

Grand Challenges in Social Physics: In Pursuit of Moral Behavior

Grand Challenges in Social Physics: In Pursuit of Moral Behavior

Leaving bads provides better outcome than approaching goods in a social dilemma

Effects of updating rules on the coevolving prisoner’s dilemma

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About