Leaving bads provides better outcome than approaching goods in a social dilemma

Abstract

Individual migration has been regarded as an important factor for the evolution of cooperation in mobile populations. Motivations of migration, however, can be largely divergent: one is highly frustrated by the vicinity of an exploiter or defector, while other enthusiastically searches cooperator mates. Albeit both extreme attitudes are observed in human behavior, but their specific impacts on wellbeing remained unexplored. In this work, we propose an orientation-driven migration approach for mobile individuals in combination with the mentioned migration preferences and study their roles in the cooperation level in a two-dimensional public goods game. We find that cooperation can be greatly promoted when individuals are more inclined to escape away from their defective neighbors. On the contrary, cooperation cannot be effectively maintained when individuals are more motivated to approach their cooperative neighbors. In addition, compared with random migration, movement by leaving defectors can promote cooperation more effectively. By means of theoretical analysis and numerical calculations, we further find that when individuals only choose to escape away from their defective neighbors, the average distance between cooperators and defectors can be enlarged, hence the natural invasion of defection can be efficiently blocked. Our work, thus, provides further insight on how different migration preferences influence the evolution of cooperation in the unified framework of spatially social games. such mode of migration leads to the outbreak of cooperation. On the other hand, Chen et al proposed riskdriven migration in the collective-risk social dilemma game on a square lattice and found that risk-driven migration dramatically enhances the evolution of public cooperation when individuals move away from unfavorable locations [41].It is worth pointing out that most of previous works consider random migration [28,40], success-driven migration [27], or risk-driven migration [41] separately. They do not consider the orientation-driven migration under which different migration preferences or migration modes are considered in a unified framework. Indeed individuals can adjust their moving orientation according to these preferred modes. By means of migration they can move away from unfavorable environment, pursuit the profitable circumstances, or choose other directions as they wish in realistic situations. However, it is still unclear how such orientation-driven migration influences the evolution of cooperation and which mode of individual migration can promote the evolution of cooperation more effectively.In this work, we thereby propose an orientation-driven migration into a population of mobile individuals playing the public goods game. We assume that individuals can choose the direction of mobility depending on the strategy types of their neighbors on a two-dimensional plane under such orientation-driven migration. Correspondingly, individuals can choose to escape from neighboring defectors or move to neighboring cooperato...

Evolution of cooperation and trust in an N-player social dilemma game with tags for migration decisions

“…Some previous studies have demonstrated how different migration preferences can have varied influence on the evolution of cooperation [ 40 ]. Inspired by this, in this study, we use and compare three different methods for selecting the migration destination.…”

The conditional defector strategies can violate the most crucial supporting mechanisms of cooperation.

“…Recently, [9] showed for the rst time that strategy-neutral migration triggered strategy oscillation in a two-strategy game even without the bridging of any transition strategies (states), thus de ning a novel oscillating behavior fundamentally different from the conventional cyclic dominance previously found in a game of at least three or more strategies. [10] studied the impact of varying migration preferences in promoting cooperation. They revealed the role of orientation-driven migration, where individuals prefer to move closer to their neighboring cooperators or favor escape away from their neighboring defectors.…”

When costly migration helps to improve cooperation

“…More precisely, they can collect a higher payoff individually if they defect, but if they all choose this strategy, then they will earn a smaller income than in the scenario when they cooperate. Interestingly, the conclusions are more subtle in terms of summary in the form of a simple message [21][22][23][24][25][26]. In some cases, the players' movement is proved to be harmful, while in other cases, it clearly becomes a mechanism for supporting cooperation.…”