Competing Motives in a Polarized Electorate: Political Responsiveness, Identity Defensiveness, and the Rise of Partisan Antipathy

Abstract

According to the polarization literature, the electorate has sorted into more ideologically homogenous partisan groups, and this increase in cohesion within parties has fueled animosity between partisans. But, are mass parties really as cohesive as we think? If not, what else might be helping to drive up antipathy between partisans? Building on the dual motivations theory of party identification (Groenendyk, ), I theorize that elite polarization has amplified partisans' often competing motivations: People want to be good citizens but also good partisans. Consistent with this theory, American National Election Studies (ANES) data suggest that partisans are not just evaluating the other party more negatively, but they are also reporting less positive evaluations of, and greater ambivalence toward, their own party. This suggests substantive responsiveness. On the other hand, they appear to be rationalizing continued identification with their party in the face of this ambivalence by reporting even more negative feelings toward the other party. In other words, they seem to be engaging in the “lesser of two evils” identity defense (Groenendyk, , ). Overall, these results suggest that parties need not be internally cohesive to be divided against one another, making partisan dynamics more fluid than many accounts imply.

Fake news game confers psychological resistance against online misinformation

“…As mentioned, during the approximately 15 minutes of playtime, players earn 6 badges by learning to apply six common misinformation techniques, namely: (1) impersonating people online (Goga, Venkatadri, and Gummadi, 2015;Jung, 2011;Reznik, 2013), (2) using emotional language (Aday, 2010;Gross and D'Ambrosio, 2004;Konijn, 2013;Zollo et al, 2015), (3) group polarisation (Groenendyk, 2018;Iyengar and Krupenkin, 2018;Melki and Pickering, 2014;Prior, 2013), (4) floating conspiracy theories (Jolley and Douglas, 2017;Lewandowsky, Gignac, and Oberauer, 2013;van der Linden, 2015) and building echo chambers (Flaxman, Goel, and Rao, 2016), (5) discrediting opponents (A 'Beckett, 2013;Lischka, 2017;Rinnawi, 2007), and (6) trolling people online (Griffiths, 2014;McCosker, 2014;Thacker and Griffiths, 2012) and false amplification (NATO StratCom, 2017).…”

“…The third badge teaches players about group polarisation: Artificially amplifying existing grievances and tensions between different groups in society, for example political differences, in order to garner support for or antagonism towards partisan viewpoints and policies (Groenendyk, 2018;Iyengar and Krupenkin, 2018;Melki and Pickering, 2014;Prior, 2013).…”

Affective polarization, local contexts and public opinion in America

“…Over-time shifts in affinity for one's own party and animosity toward the other party have not been symmetric 2,4,10,11 . Indeed, out-party animus has increased dramatically in recent years 2,4 while in-party warmth has, if anything, slightly declined over the same time period 10 . Consistent with evidence of increasing out-party animosity, individuals report that they are less likely to date those from the…”

Donald Trump and the Parties: Impeachment, Pandemic, Protest, and Electoral Politics in 2020

“…Trump's impact on attitudes toward the parties also registered in the continuing growth of “negative partisanship”—dislike of the other party—which has been a notable component of the trend toward greater polarization in the electorate (Abramowitz and Webster 2016; 2018; Groenendyk 2018; Iyengar and Krupenkin 2018). Analyses of the ANES time series show that feelings toward the rival party as measured by the 0 to 100−point “feeling thermometer” have become much colder over the past several decades, falling from an average of just under 50 degrees in 1980 to a record low of 23 degrees when Trump and Hillary Clinton faced off in 2016.…”