Many organizations rely on their members to develop solutions to specific problems. Universities establish search committees to hire at the senior level or to recommend changes to the curriculum. In a very similar fashion, standards bodies routinely form working groups to define the properties of a new technological standard. In both settings, there are no readily available solutions (i.e., candidates, curricula, standards) from which to select. Instead, the members of the organization must invest time and effort developing potential solutions. Furthermore, different members may have conflicting preferences over the feasible alternatives: which candidate to hire or which courses or patents to include in the curriculum or standard, respectively. Finally, as decision rights are typically shared, members must ultimately come to an agreement over which proposed solution to adopt.The following problem is at the heart of all these examples. Because developing a proposal is costly, the first agent who presents a concrete proposal acquires considerable bargaining power. The other agents can avoid further development costs by approving his project and, hence, are willing to endorse projects that are not ideal from their perspective. When agents have conflicting preferences over potential * Bonatti: Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 100 Main Street, Cambridge, MA 02142 (e-mail: bonatti@mit.edu); Rantakari: Simon School of Business, University of Rochester, 252 Elmwood Avenue, Rochester, NY 14627 (e-mail: heikki.rantakari@simon.rochester.edu). We gratefully acknowledge the support of the Project on Innovation in Markets and Organizations (PIMO) at the MIT Sloan School. We would like to thank