2008
DOI: 10.3386/w14590
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Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Evidence from Timber Auctions

Abstract: a co-editor and our referees for helpful suggestions. We are especially grateful to Rob Porter for detailed and insightful comments. Dominic Coey provided outstanding research assistance. Athey and Levin acknowledge the support of the National Science Foundation and Levin thanks the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment p… Show more

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Cited by 132 publications
(244 citation statements)
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References 27 publications
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“…In recent years, economists markets and traditional price competition is very close. In recent years, economists have developed a set of empirical methods for analyzing auction markets that in have developed a set of empirical methods for analyzing auction markets that in many ways parallel the imperfect competition framework discussed above (Athey many ways parallel the imperfect competition framework discussed above (Athey and Haile, 2006;Hendricks and Porter, 2007). and Haile, 2006;Hendricks and Porter, 2007).…”
Section: Competition In Auction Markets Competition In Auction Marketsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In recent years, economists markets and traditional price competition is very close. In recent years, economists have developed a set of empirical methods for analyzing auction markets that in have developed a set of empirical methods for analyzing auction markets that in many ways parallel the imperfect competition framework discussed above (Athey many ways parallel the imperfect competition framework discussed above (Athey and Haile, 2006;Hendricks and Porter, 2007). and Haile, 2006;Hendricks and Porter, 2007).…”
Section: Competition In Auction Markets Competition In Auction Marketsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…2 Entry effects can also be observed in Independent Private Value auctions. In fact, Athey, Levin and Seira (2011) show evidence supporting that they are present in U.S. timber auctions. However, these effects can only arise if there are costs to entering the auction.…”
mentioning
confidence: 89%
“…Several jurisdictions also use variants of the first price sealed bid auctions to allocate the rights to harvest publicly owned forests (e.g. U.S. National Forest Service; British Columbia, France and Romania; see for instance Athey and Levin, 2001;Athey Levin and Seira, 2011;Baldwyn, Marshall, and Richard, 1997;Li and Perrigne, 2003;Mead, 1968;Paarsch, 1992;Saphores et al, 2007).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Hong and Shum (1999) found that, the costs of procurement auctions increased by 30% as the number of bidders increases from 3 to 6 bidders. Athey et al (2004), observed that the competition with unknown bidders (sealed envelopes) attracts more bidders than the open auctions with generating higher revenue.…”
Section: External Business Environmentmentioning
confidence: 99%