Company tax reform with a water's edge

Riedel, Nadine; Runkel, Marco

doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.11.001

Cited by 68 publications

(74 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…The CCCTB in the recent EU proposal (European Commission, 2016) will only apply within the EU, implying that traditional transfer pricing and permanent establishment concepts will still be applied at the "water's edge", where EU firms transact with their affiliates outside the EU. In practical terms, this makes it questionable how effective the CCCTB will be at reducing tax dodging, compared to the status quo plus nowadays BEPS (Riedel and Runkel, 2007). From this paper's viewpoint of learning among governments, water's edge issues relate to the question of whom precisely players (governments) include in their set of comparables, when assessing and revising their policies.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Tax Competition with Formulary Apportionment

Wagener

2017

SSRN Journal

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Tax Competition with Formulary Apportionment

Wagener

2017

SSRN Journal

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“…With regard to the implementation of an FA system, similar approaches can be found in Nielsen, Raimondos-Møller and Schjelderup (2004), Sørensen (2004) and Riedel and Runkel (2007). The main argument in this literature goes as follows.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 92%

“…Our paper is most closely related to the recent contribution by Riedel and Runkel (2007). These authors analyze the e¤ects of introducing an FA system when there are tax havens which are not subject to the FA regime.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 95%

Tax enforcement and tax havens under formula apportionment

Becker

Fuest

2009

Int Tax Public Finance

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractIn this paper, we consider optimal tax enforcement policy in the presence of pro…t shifting towards tax havens. We show that, under separate accounting, tax enforcement levels may be too high due to negative …scal externalities. In contrast, under formula apportionment, tax enforcement is likely to be too low due to positive externalities of tax enforcement. Our results challenge recent contributions arguing that, under formula apportionment, there is a tendency towards ine¢ ciently high levels of (e¤ective) tax rates.JEL Codes: H25, F23

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“…Following Eichner and Runkel (2011), the total stock of capital is fixed, but the return to capital is endogenous. Most other papers consider the smallcountry case where the return to capital is exogenous (see, e.g., Wellisch, 2004;Pethig and Wagener, 2007;Pinto, 2007;Riedel and Runkel, 2007;Nielsen, Raimondos, Moeller, and Schjelderup, 2010). 4.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…4. Most papers treat profit shifting as an additive-separable component of profits (see, e.g., Riedel and Runkel, 2007;Eichner and Runkel, 2011). This paper takes a different approach by explicitly modeling the debt policy of multinationals where debt is an implicit profit shifting device leading to complex interactions with investment.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multinational financial structure and tax competition

Wrede

2013

Swiss J Economics Statistics

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Summary This paper analyzes tax competition when welfare maximizing jurisdictions levy source-based corporate taxes and multinational enterprises choose tax-efficient capital-to-debt ratios. Under separate accounting, multinationals shift debt from low-tax to high-tax countries. The Nash equilibrium of the tax competition game is characterized by underprovision of publicly provided goods. Under formula apportionment, the country-specific capital-to-debt ratio of a multinational’s affiliate is independent of the jurisdiction’s tax rate. Public good provision is either too large or too small. However, there is clearly underprovision under formula apportionment if the debt externality is not negative.

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Company tax reform with a water's edge

Cited by 68 publications

References 15 publications

Evolutionary Tax Competition with Formulary Apportionment

Evolutionary Tax Competition with Formulary Apportionment

Tax enforcement and tax havens under formula apportionment

Multinational financial structure and tax competition

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