Germans are unable to assess their own position in the income distribution of their country and do not know much about income inequality and stratification. They are well aware of their ignorance. Germans would prefer society to be more egalitarian than they perceive it. Providing accurate information about the income distribution does not change this preference for more redistribution-except among those who learn that they are net contributors in the German tax-transfer system.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We analyse tax competition with corporate income taxes in a common market where tax revenues are allocated according to an apportionment formula. Generally, tax competition is sharper (i.e., equilibrium tax rates are lower) the more tax-elastic is the apportionment formula. This depends on the properties of production technologies. In particular: (i) With fixed labour input, tax competition is sharpest if apportionment is based on property-shares, followed by the sales-and payroll-shares. (ii) If capital and labour are endogenous and technologies are Cobb-Douglas, tax competition under the property-and the payroll-share rule is sharper than under the sales-share formula. Factor elasticities determine whether payroll-or property-share apportionment generates sharper tax competition. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayJEL Code: D81, D21.

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We analyze comparative static effects under uncertainty when a decision maker has mean-variance preferences and faces a generic, quasi-linear decision problem with both an endogenous risk and a background risk. In terms of mean-variance preferences, we fully characterize the effects of changes in the location, scale, and concordance parameters of the stochastic environment on optimal risk taking. Presupposing compatibility between the mean-variance and the expected-utility approach, we then translate these mean-variance properties into their analogues for von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions.