Commerce and communications

Merchant guilds, taxation and social capital

“…The key di¤erence between this setting and the one with a single ex-ante transfer to the ruler is that merchants'expected future returns from collusion now have to take into account the future fees to be paid to the ruler, which makes it harder to sustain collusion: formally, the e¤ect is akin to the e¤ect of the coordination and organization cost f . 73 Thus imperfect commitment tends to make the guild regime less attractive, relative to the tax collector regime. One implication is that kings and powerful lords should have been more likely to grant recognition and privileges to merchant guilds than smaller, less powerful lords, since they had greater commitment power, other things held equal.…”

Gråfjellprosjektet Bind 4:: I randen av taigaen – bosetning og ressursutnyttelse i jernalder og middelalderen i Østerdalen

“…Etter denne tida er det ingen tegn på ytterligere vekst i handelen. I løpet av 1200-tallet utviklet den hanseatiske liga en administrativ struktur som etter hvert førte til kontroll over de fleste handelsrutene i Østersjøen og Nordsjøen (Reyerson 1999:62, Gaimster 2005. I slutten av århundret dominerte de ikke bare handelssjøfarten med sine egne områder og Norge, men de hadde også arbeidet seg inn i den norske Englands-trafikken (Nedkvitne 1977:120 ff., 145-147, 166, Helle 1991.…”

Who will monitor the monitors? Informal law enforcement and collusion at Champagne

“…Other historical sources, besides the ones already mentioned, that I have consulted include Bourquelot (1865), Bautier (1970), Gelderblom (2005), Munro (1999Munro ( , 2003, Volckart and Mangels (1999), Reyerson (1999), Keene and Rumble (1985), Halphen (1964) and Dobson (2000). I refer to these in the relevant portions of my model.…”

“…But it points to fair authorities who controlled entry to the fair, heard disputes and attempted to punish cheating merchants by barring them from future fairs until they made restitution. These fair authorities usually consisted of two "fair wardens" assisted by a number of subordinates including lawyers, clerks and notaries (Volckart and Mangels, 1999;Ogilvie, 2011;Reyerson, 1999). The wardens were usually chosen from among the local bourgeoisie (Reyerson, 1999) and the fair wardens' court had independent jurisdiction over commercial disputes at the fairs.…”

“…These fair authorities usually consisted of two "fair wardens" assisted by a number of subordinates including lawyers, clerks and notaries (Volckart and Mangels, 1999;Ogilvie, 2011;Reyerson, 1999). The wardens were usually chosen from among the local bourgeoisie (Reyerson, 1999) and the fair wardens' court had independent jurisdiction over commercial disputes at the fairs. The princely and ecclesiastical sponsors of the fairs also empowered the fair wardens' court to bar particular merchants from future fairs when judicial institutions in these defaulting merchants' home towns failed to compel them to make restitution (Munro, 2003).…”