A large body of theoretical literature suggests that capital structure plays an important role as a managerial incentive mechanism. What of the evidence for the agency approach? Crosssectional empirical studies have identified a positive effect of leverage on expected performance (measured by Q) for firms with low growth opportunities. However, this evidence does not take into account the endogeneity of capital structure decisions. Our paper investigates the determinants of capital structure and performance, allowing for endogeneity and dynamics. Our results suggest that conclusions reached by previous studies which did not take into account the endogeneity issue should be treated with caution.What determines firms' capital structure decisions? What are the implications for firm performance? These questions have attracted a great deal of attention in the theoretical literature on firms' financial structure; see Harris and Raviv (1991) for an excellent survey, as well as Hart (1995) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) for more recent discussions. Our paper examines the same questions empirically, in the light of existing theories and notably the agency literature which highlights the potential role of debt as a mechanism to mitigate conflicts between management and shareholders (
I study the transmission of collective memory as a mechanism for cultural transmission, in the presence of social externalities associated with individual cultural investment decisions. The younger generation's decisions depend on beliefs about the quality of existing institutions, norms, and values, which are influenced by collective memory. In culturally homogeneous societies it can be optimal to suppress negative memories while emphasizing positive ones. However, the ability to bias collective memory is costly: it may generate cultural overoptimism and overinvestment in some cases, the reverse in other cases. The scope for welfare-enhancing manipulation of collective memory is reduced, moreover, in culturally heterogeneous societies. (JEL D83, Z13)
The available evidence from numerous studies suggests that overconfidence varies significantly across countries. We develop a model that endogenizes these differences and examines their economic consequences. A crucial determinant of differences in overconfidence is the degree of expected stability of the environment, with greater changefulness giving rise to more overconfident beliefs. When stability is endogenized, multiple equilibria can emerge, "dynamism" and overconfidence reinforcing each other in one case, stability and realistic self-assessment in another. Evidence from 38 countries is consistent with this relationship. Our model also sheds light on differences in overconfidence across individuals. We conduct a large-scale survey in China and find evidence consistent with the model's cross-sectional implications.
This paper explores a new role for venture capitalists, as knowledge intermediaries. A venture capital investor can communicate valuable knowledge to an entrepreneur, facilitating innovation. The venture capitalist can also communicate the entrepreneur's innovative knowledge to other portfolio companies. We study the costs and benefits of these two forms of knowledge transfer, and their implications for investment, innovation, and product market competition. The model also sheds light on the choice between venture capital and other forms of finance, and the determinants of the decision to seek patent protection for innovations. Our analysis provides a rationale for the use of contingencies (specifically, patent approval) in VC contracts documented by Kaplan and Stromberg (2003), and for recent evidence on patterns of syndication among venture capitalists.
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