Collective Memory, Cultural Transmission, and Investments

Dessï, Roberta

doi:10.1257/aer.98.1.534

Cited by 56 publications

(40 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…A similar assumption is also made in Bénabou and Tirole (2006), Bénabou (2008Bénabou ( , 2013, and Dessi (2008). P sends.…”

Section: Timing and Information Structuresupporting

confidence: 70%

“…More recently, various papers have looked at intergenerational transmission of norms concerning fertility and female labor supply decisions (Fernandez and Fogli, 2009), of values favoring trust and cooperation (Tabellini, 2008a,b andCahuc, 2010) and of preferences regarding patience and work ethic (Doepke and Zilibotti, 2006). This paper is also related to recent literature that deals with various examples of distorted collective understanding of reality, such as anti and pro-redistribution ideologies (Bénabou, 2008, Bénabou andTirole, 2006), over-optimism (andover-pessimism) about the value of existing cultural norms (Dessi, 2008), contagious exuberance in organizations (Bénabou, 2013), and no-trust-no-trade equilibria due to pessimistic beliefs about the trustworthiness of others (Guiso et al, 2008). In Bénabou (2008Bénabou ( , 2013, the individuals themselves distort own processing of information.…”

Section: Review Of the Literaturementioning

confidence: 96%

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Doubts and Dogmatism in Conflict Behavior

Gordon

Riboni

2010

SSRN Journal

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Abstract.Conflicts are likely less violent if individuals entertain the possibility that the opponent may be right. Why is it so di cult to observe this attitude?In this paper, we consider a game of conflict where two opponents fight in order to impose their preferred policy. Before entering the conflict, one opponent (the agent) trusts the information received by his principal. The principal wants to a↵ect the agent's e↵ort, but he also cares that the agent selects the correct policy and that he has the right incentives to acquire information.We find conditions under which the principal induces hawkish attitudes in the agent. As a result, the agent has no doubts about the optimality of his preferred policy, conflicts are violent and bad decisions are sometimes made. Under some other conditions, the agent adopts dovish attitudes of systematic doubt and conflicts are less violent.JEL Classification: D74, D64.

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“…A similar assumption is also made in Bénabou and Tirole (2006), Bénabou (2008Bénabou ( , 2013, and Dessi (2008). P sends.…”

Section: Timing and Information Structuresupporting

confidence: 70%

Section: Review Of the Literaturementioning

confidence: 96%

Doubts and Dogmatism in Conflict Behavior

Gordon

Riboni

2010

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…More recently, various papers have looked at intergenerational transmission of norms concerning fertility and female labour supply decisions (Fernandez and Fogli, 2009), of values favouring trust and cooperation (Tabellini, 2008a,b;Algan and Cahuc, 2010), and of preferences regarding patience and work ethic (Doepke and Zilibotti, 2006). This article is also related to recent literature that deals with various examples of distorted collective understanding of reality, such as anti and pro-redistribution ideologies (B enabou and Tirole, 2006;B enabou, 2008), over-optimism (and overpessimism) about the value of existing cultural norms (Dessi, 2008), contagious exuberance in organisations (B enabou, 2013), and no-trust-no-trade equilibria due to pessimistic beliefs about the trustworthiness of others (Guiso et al, 2008). In B enabou (2008In B enabou ( , 2013, the individuals themselves distort their own processing of information.…”

Section: Review Of the Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Doubts and Dogmatism in Conflict Behaviour

Gordon

Riboni

2015

Econ J

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International audienceWe consider a conflict under incomplete information where two opponents fight to impose their preferred policy. Before the conflict, one opponent (the agent) trusts the information received by his principal. Under some conditions, the principal induces hawkish attitudes in the agent: the agent never doubts the optimality of his preferred policy, conflicts are violent, and bad decisions are sometimes made. Under other conditions, the agent believes that his opponent may be right, even when all evidence indicates that the policy preferred by the opponent is certainly suboptimal. In this case, the agent adopts dovish attitudes and conflicts are less violent

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“…See e.g. Dessi (2008) and Corneo and Jeanne (2009). 11 We do not need to assume that parents and children watch TV together or watch the same programmes.…”

Section: The Basic Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Parents, Television and Cultural Change

Hauk

Immordino

2013

Econ J

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This paper develops a model of cultural transmission where television plays a central role for socialization. Parents split their free time between educating their children which is costly and watching TV which though entertaining might socialize the children to the wrong trait. The free to air television industry maximizes advertisement revenue. We show that TV watching is increasing in cultural coverage, cost of education, TV's entertainment value and decreasing in the perceived cultural distance between the two traits. A monopolistic television industry captures all TV watching by both groups if the perceived cultural distance between groups is small relative to the TV's entertainment value. Otherwise, more coverage will be given to the most pro…table group where pro…tability increases in group size, advertisement sensitivity and perceived cultural distance. This leads to two possible steady states where one group is larger but both groups survive in the long run. Competition in the media industry might lead to cultural extinction but only if one group is very insensitive to advertisement and not radical enough not to watch TV. We brie ‡y discuss the existing evidence for the empirical predictions of the model. Keywords: television, socialization, cultural trait dynamics, media coverage.JEL classi…cation: Z1; D03; L82.We thank Andrea Prat and Pasquale Schiraldi for useful comments. This research was started when both authors were visiting the economics department of the LSE whom we thank for its hospitality. Hauk acknowledges …nancial support from CICYT project number ECO2009-12695 and from the government of Catalonia.

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Collective Memory, Cultural Transmission, and Investments

Cited by 56 publications

References 34 publications

Doubts and Dogmatism in Conflict Behavior

Doubts and Dogmatism in Conflict Behavior

Doubts and Dogmatism in Conflict Behaviour

Parents, Television and Cultural Change

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