Comitology: the strength of dissent

Abstract

This article sheds new light on deliberative dynamics at work in comitology.Starting from the findings of previous research on the frequency of consensus within the comitology committees of the EU in 2008, this article seeks to provide a measure of the intensity of opposition to the Commission's draft implementing proposals before and after the 2011 comitology reform. Applying this approach to data from the comitology register (2008)(2009)(2010)(2011)(2012)(2013), the article analyses the structure of contestation, proposes an index of opposition and tests the factors that may explain variations. Attention is paid to procedural choices and sociological arguments before and after the last reform of the comitology system. Our findings are fourfold. First, conflict with the Commission's positions, although weak, is not that rare during deliberations. Second, patterns of support and opposition are stable over time. Third, sharp cross-sectorial variations exist. Four, procedural choices matter for contestation. When member states have strong national preferences, they opt for more constraining procedures and will be less inclined to engage in consensual dynamics.

Unveiling Inconsistency: Consensus and Contestation along the Council–Comitology Cycle of EU Policy‐Making

“…We acknowledge that this operationalization provides a simplified view of how member states behave as inconsistency can occur in quite different situations of contestation. Yet, as a previous study on comitology demonstrates that in practice extreme diversity is rare and that in general when there is contestation, this opposition is weak (Fernández‐Pasarín et al ., 2021), we consider it to be useful in that it allows visualization of four unanimity–contestation scenarios.…”

“…The choice of the comitology procedure is goal‐oriented and may influence voting results (Dehousse et al ., 2014; Fernández‐Pasarín et al ., 2021). Dehousse et al .…”

“…The choice of the comitology procedure is goal-oriented and may influence voting results (Dehousse et al, 2014;Fernández-Pasarín et al, 2021). Dehousse et al (2014) and Fernández-Pasarín et al (2021) have shown that although contestation can be found in all categories, dissent appears to be more frequent and stronger in committees when the procedures are more constraining for the Commission. As indicated by Brandsma and Blom-Hansen (2010), in some committees, the Commission can be very active and act as both a mediator and a policy advocate.…”

“…Although such changes do not necessarily reflect shifting policy content or coalition patterns, our approach is relevant as it does not only complement previous separate studies on behavioural patterns in the Council and in comitology but also helps provide insight into EU decision-making dynamics. In this respect, while an important strand of research has argued that consensus is the general pattern of conduct at both levels of decision-making (Mattila, 2004;Heisenberg, 2005;Hayes-Renshaw et al, 2006;Blom-Hansen, 2014;Hagemann et al, 2017), other studies identifying different degrees of disagreement both in the Council (Thomson and Torenvlied, 2011;Hobolt and Wratil, 2020) and in comitology (Dehousse et al, 2014;Fernández-Pasarín et al, 2021) would challenge this view. The present article shows that inconsistent voting results occur more often than not, and it raises the question of what drives inconsistency.…”

Measuring actual discretion of the European Commission: Using the discretion index to guide empirical research

“…While the Commission enjoys a strong position in implementation committees (Finke and Blom-Hansen, 2021: 5), the intensity of control efforts exerted by the Council and EP varies. Concerning the Council, one can gauge the intensity of control through the number of dissenting votes, which occurs in about 20% of implementing acts (Fernández Pasarín et al, 2021: 317). Between 2014 and 2020, the DCI committee met 70 times and adopted 303 decisions, 8 of which without a positive opinion but, also then, only with ‘no’ opinion (not a dissenting vote).…”