Combining Top-Down and Bottom-Up Accountability: Evidence from a Bribery Experiment

Serra, Danila

doi:10.1093/jleo/ewr010

Cited by 109 publications

(77 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Institutional anticorruption aims to reduce corruption incidence, though its effectiveness appears nuanced and varies across practices and contexts (Choi, 2009;Heilbrunn, 2004;Serra, 2011). Extant literature provides a plethora of favorable evidence for top-down practices (Abbink, Irlenbusch, & Renner, 2002;Huther & Shah, 2000).…”

Section: Whistleblowing Acts: Condition On Corruption Incidencementioning

confidence: 99%

Why so few acting whistleblowers? Impacts of institutional anticorruption

2019

Governance

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Despite strong whistleblowing intention, very few truly act to blow the whistle. Building on a random sample of local citizens with citywide anticorruption performance indicators, this study investigated the linkages between institutional anticorruption and citizens' whistleblowing acts, both directly and indirectly via situational settings (i.e., corruption incidence and corruptive climate). The findings confirmed the impacts of varying anticorruption practices and detected both direct and indirect trajectories. More judicial convictions against senior officials directly reduced citizens' subsequent whistleblowing acts, but also indirectly invited more as they signaled more ensuing corruption incidence, with overall effects toward reduced whistleblowing. More citywide public whistleblowing incentivized more individual whistleblowing subsequently; yet, such effects were canceled out as such practices also deterred ensuing corruption incidence and indirectly reduced citizens' acts. The total effects explained why there were so few acting whistleblowers. The study concludes with discussion of research findings and potential policy implications.

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Section: Whistleblowing Acts: Condition On Corruption Incidencementioning

confidence: 99%

Why so few acting whistleblowers? Impacts of institutional anticorruption

2019

Governance

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“…In the last decade, a growing number of studies have applied experimental methodologies to the study of corruption. The existing experimental literature has provided valuable insights into the effectiveness of top-down enforcement mechanisms (Abbink, Irlenbusch, and Renner 2002), asymmetric punishment (Abbink et al 2014), different sets of monetary incentives (Armantier and Boly 2013), as well as nonmonetary factors (Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt 2006;Barr and Serra 2009) and bottom-up punishment systems (Banuri and Eckel 2012;Cameron et al 2009;Serra 2012). 6 Most previous studies have focused on collusive corruption, that is, the exchange of bribes for the provision of an illegal service, and have granted service providers monopoly power over the good demanded by the potential bribe-payer.…”

Section: A Review Of the Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…2. For examples of studies using cross-country data, see Treisman (2000) and Serra (2006). For examples of studies using firm-or household-level data, see Svensson (2003) and Hunt (2007).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is More Competition Always Better? An Experimental Study of Extortionary Corruption

Ryvkin

Serra

2018

Economic Inquiry

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Using a laboratory experiment, we assess whether increasing competition among public officials reduces extortionary corruption. We find that increasing the number of providers has no effect on bribe demands when citizens' search costs are high, but it increases corruption when search costs are low. The effect is absent in a parallel setting framed as a standard market, which we attribute to citizens using a nonsequential search strategy as opposed to sequential search in the corruption setting. We conclude that efforts to reduce search costs, such as infrastructure investments, are preferable to anti‐corruption policies aimed at increasing the number of providers. (JEL D73, D49, C91)

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“…Not surprisingly, the combined approach constitutes another option (Serra 2011). Lab experiments (Abbink, Irlenbusch, and Renner 2002; Barr and Serra 2010;Drugov, Hamman, and Serra 2014;Serra 2011) find strong evidence in support of different approaches (Abbink and Serra 2012), particularly the combined one (Serra 2011). However, do lab findings pass the test of nuanced reality?…”

Section: Evidence For Practicementioning

confidence: 99%

Institutional Anticorruption in China: Effectiveness on Bribery Incidence

Xing

2018

Public Administration Review

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This article investigates the effectiveness of anticorruption practices against bribery incidence, highlighting top‐down and bottom‐up approaches. A random survey of local residents is used in conjunction with institutional anticorruption indicators. Findings suggest that the top‐down approach works, but with substantial variation across practices. More intense top‐down anticorruption deters bribery incidence within citizens' dense networks, and more judicial convictions directly suppress citizens' bribery experience and willingness. The bottom‐up and combined approaches yield both deterrence and signaling effects, contingent on institutional parameters. More public whistle‐blowing deters citizens' bribery experience and willingness, yet, when coupled with more intense top‐down anticorruption, it signals severe government corruption and predicts more bribery incidence. On the contrary, more grievance filings predict more bribery incidence via signaling effects, but, when bundled with more intense top‐down anticorruption, they deter citizens' subsequent bribery experience and willingness. The article concludes with a discussion of the research findings and theoretical and practical implications.

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Combining Top-Down and Bottom-Up Accountability: Evidence from a Bribery Experiment

Cited by 109 publications

References 16 publications

Why so few acting whistleblowers? Impacts of institutional anticorruption

Why so few acting whistleblowers? Impacts of institutional anticorruption

Is More Competition Always Better? An Experimental Study of Extortionary Corruption

Institutional Anticorruption in China: Effectiveness on Bribery Incidence

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