Institutional Anticorruption in China: Effectiveness on Bribery Incidence

Abstract

This article investigates the effectiveness of anticorruption practices against bribery incidence, highlighting top‐down and bottom‐up approaches. A random survey of local residents is used in conjunction with institutional anticorruption indicators. Findings suggest that the top‐down approach works, but with substantial variation across practices. More intense top‐down anticorruption deters bribery incidence within citizens' dense networks, and more judicial convictions directly suppress citizens' bribery experience and willingness. The bottom‐up and combined approaches yield both deterrence and signaling effects, contingent on institutional parameters. More public whistle‐blowing deters citizens' bribery experience and willingness, yet, when coupled with more intense top‐down anticorruption, it signals severe government corruption and predicts more bribery incidence. On the contrary, more grievance filings predict more bribery incidence via signaling effects, but, when bundled with more intense top‐down anticorruption, they deter citizens' subsequent bribery experience and willingness. The article concludes with a discussion of the research findings and theoretical and practical implications.

Top-Down Accountability, Social Unrest, and Anticorruption in China

“…The principal-agent framework in anticorruption research assumes that political leaders (or high-level officials) are benevolent, that is, they have the incentive to reduce corruption and maximize social welfare (e.g., Groenendijk, 1997;Klitgaard, 1988;Rose-Ackerman, 1978). Accordingly, this framework emphasizes the importance of monitoring and sanctioning state agents who tend to abuse their power for personal gain (Avis et al, 2018;Bobonis et al, 2016;Ni & Su, 2019;Olken, 2007;Serra, 2012). Our study assumes that high-level officials and state agents in authoritarian governments are primarily concerned with their prospects of career advancement.…”

“…Our research makes several contributions to the existing scholarship. First, departing from recent evidence-based research that has documented the effectiveness of top-down monitoring in curbing corruption (Avis et al, 2018; Bobonis et al, 2016; Ni & Su, 2019; Olken, 2007; Serra, 2012), we shift attention to the incentives for fighting corruption and enforcing top-down monitoring strategies in local governments. Second, to the extent that some scholars emphasize the importance of top leadership's political will in combating corruption (e.g., Choi, 2009; Quah, 1994), we advance this line of research by studying how anticorruption initiatives at higher levels of governments translate into front-line officials’ efforts on the ground, and exploring what drives anticorruption initiatives in the first place.…”

Introduction to PAR Symposium of Understanding and Reducing Public Corruption

“…Jancsics's () article provides an innovative conceptual framework to classify corruption types and anticorruption tools to match the two for more desirable policy outcomes. Three articles in the symposium pay close attention to the propensity of individuals to engage in corruption, with Ni and Su () focusing on ordinary citizens, Zhang et al () on low‐level public employees, and Silitonga et al () on senior‐level civil servants. Araral et al’s () article also explains the proclivity for corruption at the micro level, but they use firms as the units of analysis.…”

“…2. Ni and Su (2019): "Institutional Anticorruption in China: Effectiveness on Bribery Incidence" Ni and Su investigate citizen involvement in public corruption and the effectiveness of government anticorruption efforts. Specifically, they empirically examine how top-down and bottom-up anticorruption approaches might influence citizens' bribery incidence and bribery willingness, other factors being equal.…”

How Do Intrinsic Motivations, Work‐Related Opportunities, and Well‐Being Shape Bureaucratic Corruptibility?

“…Corruption research at the individual level remains relatively scarce in the literature. Some scholars have explored attitudes about, perceptions of, or personal experiences with public corruption using survey data from citizens (e.g., Chang and Kerr ; Corbacho et al ; Ni and Su ), government clients of certain services (Ivlevs and King ; Knutsen et al ), and college students (Gong, Wang, and Ren ). Very few studies have focused specifically on the factors that lead to corruption among public employees.…”