Fighting corruption has proven to be a difficult task in many countries. In this paper, using China as a case study, we argue that a properly designed budgetary institution helps remove many institutional incentives and opportunities for corruption in financial management and regulatory activities of the government. As a result of recent budget reforms, China's anticorruption effort has shifted from its earlier emphasis on exhortation and periodic crackdowns, which have been found to be ineffective, to the more fundamental issues of institutional incentives and opportunities for corruption. We propose that one consequence of the budget reform is the hope that China's effort to create a clean government will be advanced. However, there is still a long way to go since it will take time for the new budgetary system to be institutionalized.

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This article investigates the effectiveness of anticorruption practices against bribery incidence, highlighting top‐down and bottom‐up approaches. A random survey of local residents is used in conjunction with institutional anticorruption indicators. Findings suggest that the top‐down approach works, but with substantial variation across practices. More intense top‐down anticorruption deters bribery incidence within citizens' dense networks, and more judicial convictions directly suppress citizens' bribery experience and willingness. The bottom‐up and combined approaches yield both deterrence and signaling effects, contingent on institutional parameters. More public whistle‐blowing deters citizens' bribery experience and willingness, yet, when coupled with more intense top‐down anticorruption, it signals severe government corruption and predicts more bribery incidence. On the contrary, more grievance filings predict more bribery incidence via signaling effects, but, when bundled with more intense top‐down anticorruption, they deter citizens' subsequent bribery experience and willingness. The article concludes with a discussion of the research findings and theoretical and practical implications.

As in many other countries, performance management has received wide attention in China in order to increase government efficiency and accountability. However, agency-level performance management reforms have been largely overlooked in the existing literature, with regard to the process of developing performance measures, stakeholder involvement, and the assessment of these measures. By investigating a provincial departmental case, this article reveals that the latest development of China’s performance management reform has become increasingly sophisticated, with consideration for both political legitimacy and management efficiency. However, significant challenges remain before such efforts can be fully implemented as management innovations to truly improve government performance and accountability. 和许多其他国家一样，以提高政府效率和增强政府问责为目的的绩效管理，在中国得到了广泛关注。但是，已有文献在很大程度上忽视了部门层面的绩效管理改革，并很少涉及绩效指标的开发过程、利益相关者参与，以及对这些指标的评价。本文分析了某省政府部门的案例，发现中国绩效管理改革的最新发展日趋复杂，并同时考虑政治合法性和管理效率。但是，要想将这些努力完全实施，并作为一项真正提升政府绩效和问责的管理创新，仍然面临严峻挑战。 다른 여러 나라에서와 마찬가지로, 중국에서도 성과관리는 정부 효율성과 책무성 증진을 위하여 많은 관심을 받아 왔다. 그러나 기관 수준의 성과 관리 개혁에 관한 기존의 선행연구에서는 성과 측정 지표의 개발, 이해 당사자 참여 그리고 이러한 지표에 대한 평가라는 측면이 간과되어 왔다. 본 연구는 주 단위의 부처 사례를 연구함으로써 최근 중국의 성과 관리 개혁이 정치적 적법성과 관리적 효율성을 고려라는 측면에서 매우 정교해지고 있음을 확인하였다. 하지만 그러한 노력이 실제로 정부 성과와 책무성을 개선하기 위해서는 아직 중요한 과제가 남아 있다.

This inquiry aims to investigate how the relational dynamics are imprinted on two critical dimensions of bribe-taking: corruptibility and corruption risks. Two treatments were randomly administered to 1400 subjects: single versus repeated interactions and strangers versus weak ties. The findings suggest that repeated interactions induce bigger bribe sizes, but also increase risks from whistleblowing and internal auditing. Weak ties mitigate bribe-taking willingness. Nevertheless, when coupled with repeated interactions, weak ties suppress the risks from whistleblowing, testifying the bifurcated effects. The tensions between corruptibility and corruption risks suggest that bribe-taking decisions are fraught with internal tensions, with the overall effects likely being a priori determined only in specific contexts. Such tensions are more intensified among true bureaucrats as they tend to claim bigger bribes and report more risks from internal auditing.Around the world, one in four people report paying a bribe for public service in 2017 (Transparency International, 2017). Though often in small amounts, bribe-taking claims substantial loss and preys disproportionately on ordinary citizens (World Bank, 2001). Widespread bribe-taking transforms social norms and creates a self-fulfilling prophecy (Corbacho et al., 2016). More exposure to bribe-taking results in citizens' more engagement in paying bribes (Čábelková & Hanousek, 2004). More tolerance of bribe-taking that say, extorts 5% or 10% of the value of public projects, may generate pressure to increase the take to 10% or 15% (Jain, 2001). Due to its pervasive scope and self-fulfilling dynamics, bribe-taking could be even more damaging than other forms, for which understanding its determinants warrants special attention.It is seductive to propose that strategies against bribe-taking rest on having more honest and ethical bureaucrats. Yet, a paradox is presented that sees an inalienable combination between the overwhelming moral condemnation of petty corruption (bribe-taking included) and its widespread existence (Miller, 2006;Rose-Ackerman, 2013).