Cognitive conflict as a function of socially-induced cognitive differences

Rappoport, Leon

doi:10.1177/002200276901300113

Cited by 15 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…These differences stem from the fact that they use the cues differently, i.e., they have different policies. The differences in policy are usually created by training the subjects to use the cues differently, but it is also possible to select subjects whose policies differ as a result of their preexperimental experiences (e.g.. Hammond & Brehmer, 1973; Rappoport, 1969).In most of the experiments, the conflict task is constructed in such a way that it is only partially compatible with the subjects' initial policies. In these experiments, therefore, there are two sources of policy change: the differences between the judgements of the two persons, i.e., the conflict, and the differences between each subject's judge-University of Urn&, Sweden rnents and the correct answers, i.e., the inaccuracy of the policies.…”

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confidence: 99%

Social pressure and policy change in the “lens model” interpersonal conflict paradigm

Brehmer

Garpebring

1974

Scandinavian J Psychology

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Abstract.— The effects of conflict and policy inaccuracy on policy change in the “lens model” interpersonal conflict paradigm were investigated in an experiment which compared amount of policy change for subjects who were paired with a stooge who did not change his policy even though it was incorrect with the amount of policy change for subjects whose opponents changed their policies to reduce the inaccuracy of these policies. The amount of policy change was the same in both of these conditions, indicating that task adaptation is a more important goal to the subjects than conflict reduction in these experiments.

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Social pressure and policy change in the “lens model” interpersonal conflict paradigm

Brehmer

Garpebring

1974

Scandinavian J Psychology

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“…Similar to results obtained by Hammond et al (1966), an explicit focus on the contending positions (bilateral focus) did not increase the probability of resolution over a condition in which bargainers focused explicitly on their own positions. It was necessary to augment a unilateral focus with formal strategy preparation, or to instruct bargainers to be analytical (see Rappoport, 1965) in approaching the problems, in order to hinder resolutions. Additional evidence presented by Bass (1966) indicated that the structural arrangement of prenegotiation groups (viz., unilateral vs. bilateral) per se, apart from the type of activity engaged in (e.g., preparing formal positions), made little difference in resolution outcomes of simulated union and management bargainers.…”

Section: Prior Experiencementioning

confidence: 99%

“…A discrepancy in cueweightings that served to polarize parties ideologically resulted in resistance to yielding ; also parties were more willing to compromise on the issue characterized by the shortest distance between initial positions. In addition to the nature of the cue-discrepancy, Rappoport (1965) hypothesized that the amount of cue-discrepancy would affect measures of compromise and belief change. However no difference was found between a high and a low cue-discrepancy condition in his experiment.…”

Section: Cognitive Conflictmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Studies by Summers (1968) and Rappoport (1969) were attempts to assess the effects of conflict of interest and attitudinal variables, not included as defining parameters of the &dquo;cognitive conflict&dquo; paradigm, on measures derived from the paradigm. The evidence indicates that conflict of interest variables do affect these measures, but that whether a cognitive conflict is derived from personal attitudes of contestants or from laboratory-5 These investigators also explored the effects of the placement of a "critical trial" (i.e., early vs. late confrontation of large vs. small differences between disputants) and type of verbal interchange.…”

Section: Cognitive Conflictmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The influence of the situation in interparty conflict

Druckman

1971

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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The psychological approach to the study of interpersonal conflict has been guided by a paradigm which emphasizes characteristics of individuals as the primary source of conflict. This model assumes some degree of responseconsistency across situations and roles resulting from general dispositions toward the resolution of conflicts. Representative of this approach are conceptual analogies that have been drawn between motivationally-derived interpersonal orientations toward the resolution of interpersonal conflicts and preferred orientations for national representatives toward the resolution of international conflicts (see Gladstone, 1962), and correlations obtained between scales designed to measure each of these variables (see Scott, 1965, for a review of this literature). The contrasting situational approach posits response-variation concomitant with changes in the situation or role-requirements. The importance of situational parameters as the primary source of interpersonal or intergroup conflicts has been emphasized by Blake and Mouton (1962) who have used the term &dquo;psychodynamic fallacy&dquo; to refer to the incorrect attribution of interpersonal or group behavior to the personalities of individuals. (Sherif and Sherif, 1965, take a similar position.) These conclusions were reached on the basis of observations of conflict behavior in large-scale field studies of intergroup relations. In this setting the influence of &dquo;personality&dquo; variables might indeed be moderated. Coser's (1956) distinction between &dquo;nonrealistic&dquo; (conflict in the service of drive-reduction) and &dquo;realistic&dquo;(the concomitance of scarce resources and incompatible goals) conflict parallels the distinction between &dquo;personality&dquo; and situation as sources of interparty conflict. According to Coser, the importance of these factors in the resolution of conflicts is in part a function of the nature of the social structure. For example, the prevalence of nonrealistic conflict in a society depends, inter alia, on the rigidity of the social structure.More recently, a paradigm which represents a more analytic approach to the study of conflict behavior has guided investigations of personality and situational effects. Numerous investigators over the past few years have used two-person laboratory games to explore the relative effects of several variables manipulated simultaneously. While several of these studies have demonstrated relationships between pre-experimentally assessed attitudes and behavior in dyadic conflict situations (e.g., Crowne, 1966;Druckman, 1967;Terhune, 1968), the evidence in general indicates that subject variables are not strongly predictive of conflict behavior. This failure to obtain relationships has been noted by a number of investigators (e.g., Bartos, 1967;Bixenstine and Blundell, 1966;Terhune, 1968;Wrightsman, 1966). In addition, the failure to replicate obtained relationships was made at CARLETON UNIV on June 15, 2015 jcr.sagepub.com Downloaded from 524 apparent by Terhune (1968Terhune...

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“…These differences stem from the fact that they utilize the cues differently, i. e., they have different policies. In the laboratory, these policy differences are usually brought about by training the subjects to use the information differently, but it is also possible to select subjects with different policies (e.g., Rappoport, 1969).…”

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confidence: 99%

Preliminaries to a psychology of inference

Brehmer

1979

Scandinavian J Psychology

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This paper presents a general pretheoretical framework for the study of inference. The framework is that of Social Judgment Theory which has been developed from Brunswik's probabilistic functionalism. The first section discusses the fundamental theoretical ideas and methodological principles. Important among these is the stress on the need to study the relation between the cognitive system and the inference task using parallel concepts for describing the cognitive system and the task, the theory of cognitive tasks, and the methodology of formal representative sampling. The second section describes a series of experimental paradigms developed from the basic ideas discussed in the first section. The third, and final section gives some examples of actual empirical research, mainly research concerned with the hypothesis testing process by means of which subjects learn inference tasks, studies on cognitive skills in using various rules for making inferences, new conceptions of feedback, research on the effects of feedforward, and interpersonal learning.

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Cognitive conflict as a function of socially-induced cognitive differences

Cited by 15 publications

References 6 publications

Social pressure and policy change in the “lens model” interpersonal conflict paradigm

Social pressure and policy change in the “lens model” interpersonal conflict paradigm

The influence of the situation in interparty conflict

Preliminaries to a psychology of inference

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