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Effects of nine variables on compromising behavior and time to resolution were evaluated by a meta-analysis of published bargaining experiments reported over a 25-year period. The strongest effect sizes were obtained for the variables of negotiator's orientation, prenegotiation experience, time pressure, and the initial distance between positions. The orientation effect was particularly strong when it was communicated to bargainers by constituents or by the experimenter; the position distance effect was stronger for cognitive than for interest conflicts. Significantly weaker effect sizes were shown for opponent's concession strategy, representation, and accountability. The weakest effects occurred for the large versus small issues and visibility variables. These results challenge the assertion that group representation is a key determinant of competitive behavior in bargaining. Strong pressures on representatives to be accountable to their constituents did not increase the size of the effects. Analyses of differences in procedures used in the strongest and weakest effect size studies in each category suggest a number of conditions under which bargainers are likely to be intransigent.

In this article, we examine the roles of focal points and turning points in negotiation. Both concern impasses in negotiation, and negotiators can exploit them to move past impasses. Each term uses the word “point” differently, however. A focal point refers to a single salient coordinating concept shared by the parties. A turning point is a departure that takes place during the course of a negotiation, when the course seems to change. Precipitants precede turning points and consequences follow them. In this article, we focus on the relationship of these two negotiation concepts. We raise the following questions: Does the development of focal points precipitate departures, and, if so, how? Do departures lead to the development of focal points, and, if so, how? Are there circumstances in which focal points do not precipitate turning points and vice versa? Do negotiations that feature focal points create more or less durable agreements? Do negotiations that include turning points create more or less durable agreements? To help answer these questions, we have analyzed four cases. In the German Foundation Agreement negotiation, the development of focal points precipitated turning points. In the South African Interim Constitution negotiations, turning point departures precipitated the development of focal points. And in the negotiations to end the Burundi civil war and to reach the Nouméa Accord between France and New Caledonia, parties shared focal points that did not precipitate turning points. These case analyses provide insights into the role of focal points in producing effective and durable agreements. They also suggest opportunities for further research on the interaction between these concepts.

Education at Tel-Hai College. Thanks go to Yael Efron for her assistance on the reliability analyses of the codes for the open-ended questions. We also extend our gratitude to the three anonymous referees and to the editor for their very helpful suggestions. We are pleased with the interest they showed in the issues that we addressed and in the research strategy that we developed for investigating these issues.In this article, the authors report the results of two experiments that explored hypotheses about the relative learning advantages of role-play and scenario design. The experiments were conducted with similar student populations in Australia and Israel. Using a matched-pairs design, participants were randomly assigned to design and role-play conditions. They worked on their tasks following an hour-long lecture on three negotiation concepts: alternatives, time pressure, and negotiating power. A lecture-only control group was implemented in the Australian experiment. In both experiments, designers, working "behind the scenes," indicated better concept learning in the short run than their role-play counterparts performing "onstage," as well as in comparison with the control group. They showed better understanding of the way the concepts are related and retained the learning gains over time. Moreover, the designers were at least as motivated as role-players and controls and, for the Israel participants, showed more motivation. The results, favoring designers, spread widely across the various questions, asked immediately after the experience and 1 week later: 86% of the answers given favored designers in terms of direction; 52% of these were statistically significant. Implications are discussed for explanatory mechanisms, programmatic research, and teaching/training approaches.