We analyze the security for network code when the eavesdropper can contaminate the information on the attacked edges (active attack) and can choose the attacked edges adaptively (adaptive attack). We show that active and adaptive attacks cannot improve the performance of the eavesdropper when the code is linear. Further, we give an non-linear example, in which an adaptive attack improves the performance of the eavesdropper. We derive the capacity for the unicast case and the capacity region for the multicast case or the multiple multicast case in several examples of relay networks, beyond the minimum cut theorem, when no additional random number is allowed as scramble variables in the intermediate nodes.
IndexTerms secrecy analysis, secure network coding, adaptive attack, active attack I. INTRODUCTION Secure network coding is a method securely transmitting information from the authorized sender to the authorized receiver. Cai and Yeung [1], [2], [3] discussed the secrecy for the malicious adversary, Eve, wiretapping a subset E E of all channels in the network. The papers [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10] developed several types of secure network coding. The papers [11], [12], [13], [14] showed the existence of a secrecy code that universally works for any types of eavesdroppers under the size constraint of E E . In particular, the papers [13], [14] constructed it by using the universal hashing lemma [15], [16], [17]. Further, the papers [11], [12], [18] evaluated errors when the information on a part of network is changed, but they evaluated the secrecy only when the information on a part of network is not changed or Eve did not know the replaced information. The recent paper [19] discussed the secrecy as well as the error when Eve contaminates the eavesdropped information and knows the replaced information. (For the detailed relation, see [19, Remark 8].) The effects of Eve's contamination depend on the type of the network code. When the code is linear, the contamination does not improve her performance. However, when the code is not linear, there exists only one example where the contamination improves her performance [19].Despite these developments, there are still some problems in existing studies. Although these existing studies achieved the optimal rate with secrecy condition, their optimality relies on the minimum cut theorem. That is, they assumed that the eavesdropper may choose any r-subset channels to access, and did not address another type of conditions for the eavesdropper. For example, the studies [11], [12], [13], [14] optimized only the codes in the source and terminal nodes and did not optimize the coding operations on the intermediate nodes. Also, in other existing studies, the intermediate nodes do not have as complicated codes as the source and terminal nodes. In this paper, to achieve the optimal rate beyond the minimum cut theorem, we address the optimization of the coding operations on the intermediate nodes as well as on the source and terminal nodes.Further, we consider a new type of at...