Reliable and secure communication over adversarial multipath networks: A survey

Abstract

We consider the problem of reliable and information theoretically secure communication over adversarial multi-path networks. The adversary, hidden in the multi-path network, is able to eavesdrop on and jam (possibly distinct) subsets of links. We study three types of problems -communication in the presence of non-causal adversaries, causal adversaries, and causal adversaries with passive feedback to the transmitter. For each of these problems, we further consider two types of jamming -additive jamming (modeling wireless communication) and overwrite jamming (modeling communication over wired networks). We survey recent results, and present new results for the setting with passive feedback available to the encoder -thus providing a "complete characterization" for the problem. For each variation of the problem, our results provide information theoretically optimal rates and computationally efficient codes asymptotically achieving these rates for both reliable as well as secure transmission.

Reduction Theorem for Secrecy over Linear Network Code for Active Attacks

“…As another possibility, we consider the case when the malicious adversary combines eavesdropping and contamination. That is, by contaminating a part of the channels in the network, the malicious adversary might increase the ability of eavesdropping, whereas a parallel network offers no such a possibility [ 12 , 13 , 14 ]. In fact, in arbitrarily varying channel model, noise injection is allowed after Eve’s eavesdropping, but Eve does not eavesdrop the channel after Eve’s noise injection [ 15 , 16 , 17 , 18 , 19 ].…”

Reduction Theorem for Secrecy over Linear Network Code for Active Attacks

“…As another possibility, we consider the case when the malicious adversary combines eavesdropping and contamination. That is, contaminating a part of the channels, the malicious adversary might improve the ability of eavesdropping while a parallel network offers no such a possibility [12], [13], [14]. In fact, in arbitrarily varying channel model, noise injection is allowed after Eve's eavesdropping, but Eve does not eavesdrop the channel after Eve's noise injection [15], [16], [17], [19] [18, Table I].…”