2014
DOI: 10.1111/faf.12101
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Co‐management in Latin American small‐scale shellfisheries: assessment from long‐term case studies

Abstract: Co‐management (Co‐M), defined as the sharing of management tasks and responsibilities between governments and local users, is emerging as a powerful institutional arrangement to redress fisheries paradigm failures, yet long‐term assessments of its performance are lacking. A comparative analysis of five small‐scale Latin American shellfisheries was conducted to identify factors suggesting success and failure. In Chile, Uruguay and Mexico Co‐M produced positive effects, including stabilization of landings at low… Show more

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Cited by 102 publications
(65 citation statements)
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“…Immediately before the occurrence of mass mortalities (years 1990− 1994), the fishery was governed by a co-management mode and a set of operational precautionary measures that assured low harvesting levels (Defeo 1996, 1998, Defeo et al 2016. Therefore, fishing pressure could not be invoked as a putative factor of the observed trends, as in other cases when the concurrent effects of climate and harvesting have been observed (e.g.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Immediately before the occurrence of mass mortalities (years 1990− 1994), the fishery was governed by a co-management mode and a set of operational precautionary measures that assured low harvesting levels (Defeo 1996, 1998, Defeo et al 2016. Therefore, fishing pressure could not be invoked as a putative factor of the observed trends, as in other cases when the concurrent effects of climate and harvesting have been observed (e.g.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These include: (1) the adoption of exclusive access rights (e.g., TURFs) and selfenforcement mechanisms to prevent over-exploitive fi shing practices; (2) the fl exibility of institutions to adapt management measures to prevent the impact of climatic drivers, based on the availability of sound scientifi c knowledge; (3) the development of participatory rebuilding strategies, including the implementation of decision rules to restrict harvest; and (4) the entrepreneurial capacity of cooperatives to adapt their trading strategies to the changing global fi nancial trends, thus preventing the impact of unfavorable market conditions and mitigating the bargaining power of middlemen within fi sheries' value chains. The implementation of these solutions have produced several benefi ts, including (Castilla and Defeo 2001 ;Sosa-Cordero et al 2008 ;Defeo et al 2014 ;McCay et al 2014 ): (1) improved sense of ownership and stewardship, which in turn promote legitimacy, acceptability and compliance of regulations; (2) optimization of data collection methods, minimization of confl ict and strengthening of long term strategic planning processes; (3) the creation of multilevel social networks, i.e., legal, political, and fi nancial frameworks that enhance sources of social and ecological resilience (Adger et al 2005 ); and (4) enhancement and stabilization of bioeconomic indicators such as population abundance, CPUE and economic revenues. These successful results were recognized by the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC), which certifi ed the spiny lobster fi sheries from the central zone of Baja California and the Sian Ka'an and Banco Chinchorro Biosphere Reserves in 2004 and 2012, respectively.…”
Section: What Factors Enable or Inhibit Building Institutional Adaptamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Although there is an increasing understanding of the factors that determine the success and failure of co-governance arrangements in Latin America (Castilla and Defeo 2001 ;Sosa-Cordero et al 2008 ;Gelcich et al 2010 ;Gutiérrez et al 2011 ;Defeo et al 2014 ;McCay et al 2014 ), there is still a poor understanding about how this governance mode responds to different types of crises, and how these responses are shaped by past experiences and by the particular features of the governing system and the system-to-be-governed. Such knowledge is important to understand how co-governance institutions and actors learn, self-organize and respond to diverse climatic and human drivers, as well as to design policies aimed at maintaining or increasing resilience in small-scale fi sheries (Adger et al 2005 ;Badjeck et al 2009 ).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Although the institutionalization of EAF into the national fisheries policy is not a necessary and sufficient condition for its implementation, long-term political support would facilitate a proper EAF inception and development [15]. Indeed, many successful small-scale fisheries (SSFs) have chased, analogously, the fundamental steps of EAF development and implementation, although its principles have not been included formally in their management plans.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Indeed, many successful small-scale fisheries (SSFs) have chased, analogously, the fundamental steps of EAF development and implementation, although its principles have not been included formally in their management plans. In Latin America there are many examples of comanaged SSFs [13,15,16], but examples of SSFs that have formally implemented an EAF coupled with a Co-M scheme (hereafter EAF/ Co-M) are scarcely documented [10].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%