Civil–Military Relations and Human Rights

Abstract

Do civil–military relations influence human rights practices? Building on principal–agent theory, we argue that civilian–military relations, instead of having an effect on mean levels of repression, will be associated with the dispersion in human rights practices. States where there is less control of the military or more conflict between civilian and military leadership will see a wider range of human rights practices. We test our hypotheses quantitatively on a global sample of countries, using updated data on civil–military relations and find evidence that civil–military conflict and lack of control increase the variance in human right practices.

Military Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic Crisis in Latin America: Military Presence, Autonomy, and Human Rights Violations

“…In this scenario, information on human rights violations that occur will not be divulged, and no punitive actions will be taken. As Bell et al (2021) point out, a lack of proper monitoring can afford military agents the opportunity to abuse human rights, contrary to the wishes of the principal. They may choose this option because they are conditioned to react violently.…”

Revisiting the Causal Links between Economic Sanctions and Human Rights Violations

“…Furthermore, our research highlights the importance of looking specifically at the agents of abuse, a topic of growing importance in the repression literature (Bell et al 2019;Bohara et al 2008;Cingranelli, Fajardo-Heyward, and Filippov 2014;Clay and Digiuseppe 2017;Englehart 2009;Herbst 2004). By investigating how security agents' incentives could be affected by government changes as a result of sanctions, we are able to show how international factors can affect domestic conditions through seemingly innocuous changes in bureaucratic functioning.…”

“…However, not all human rights abuses are a result of a direct order. Even in consolidated democracies with long traditions of respect for human rights norms, some human rights abuses occur as a result of agent discretion or shirking (Bell et al 2019; Bohara et al 2008; Cingranelli, Fajardo-Heyward, and Filippov 2014; Clay and Digiuseppe 2017; Englehart 2009; Herbst 2004). When left unmonitored, a police or military officer may torture a suspected terrorist because it appears to make the task of getting information from the suspect easier.…”

Lethal aid and human security: The effects of US security assistance on civilian harm in low- and middle-income countries

“…Theory: security assistance, security forces with agency, and state violence While early scholarship on repression focused almost exclusively on the costs and benefits of employing repression for leaders, recent advances acknowledge the agency of the security sector-the military, police, and other security forces that must implement orders to forcibly repress dissent (Bell et al, 2021;DeMeritt, 2016). Assuming that leaders have incentives to call on the state's security forces to contain civilian mobilizations that threaten their hold on power, this literature asks when security forces are likely to comply with orders to use coercive force (Albrecht and Ohl, 2016;Poe, 2004;Tyson, 2018;DeMeritt, 2015;Dragu and Lupu, 2018;Frugé, 2019).…”