Churchill's naval holiday: Arms control and the Anglo‐German naval race, 1912–1914

Maurer, John H.

doi:10.1080/01402399208437475

Cited by 6 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…200 See Padfield, 1974, for the description of the race and Langhorne, 1971. Lynn-Jones, 1986, Maurer, 1992for 1912 subsequent decades, Britain did its best to orchestrate an orderly dismantling of its Empire and emerged as the closest ally of the new dominant power -the United States.…”

Section: What Was the Historical Outcome Of British Choices?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Sustaining Global Leadership

2023

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Section: What Was the Historical Outcome Of British Choices?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Sustaining Global Leadership

2023

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“…Nothing in my opinion would more surely dishearten Germany, than the certain proof that as the result of all her present and prospective efforts she will only be more hopelessly behindhand. 71 First, by devolving regional hegemony to the United States (Hay-Paunceforte Treaty of 1901) and Japan (Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902), Britain was able to redeploy these freed-up squadrons to its home waters after the Fisher reforms (1904-05). Second, between 1905-12, Britain built 32 Dreadnought-type battleships to Germany's 21.…”

Section: Punishing Germanymentioning

confidence: 99%

Britain's paradox: cooperation or punishment prior to World War I

Lobell¹

2001

Rev. Int. Stud.

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In the three decades prior to World War I, Britain's paradox was whether to cooperate with or punish an emerging Germany, Japan, France, Russia, and the United States. Based on the need for economy, successive Chancellors of the Exchequer pressed for cooperating with the contenders. Members of the services and Conservatives pushed to punish these contenders, countering that Britain could afford the rising naval expenditure needed to implement such a programme. The existing literature emphasizes the role of geopolitics, domestic constraints, and individual idiosyncrasies to explain Britain's foreign policy adjustment. I argue that the nature of the foreign commercial policy of the contenders guided Britain's response. Due to the special affinity among commercially liberal states, Britain cooperated with America and Japan, ceding regional governance to both aspiring regional hegemons. Britain did, however, punish non-liberal France, Germany, and Russia by implementing new naval construction programmes and concentrating freed-up military resources until these countries capitulated in their naval challenge.

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Entente diplomacyv. détente, 1911–1914

Otte¹

2015

The Wars Before the Great War

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Churchill's naval holiday: Arms control and the Anglo‐German naval race, 1912–1914

Cited by 6 publications

References 4 publications

Sustaining Global Leadership

Sustaining Global Leadership

Britain's paradox: cooperation or punishment prior to World War I

Entente diplomacyv. détente, 1911–1914

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