Britain's paradox: cooperation or punishment prior to World War I

Abstract

In the three decades prior to World War I, Britain's paradox was whether to cooperate with or punish an emerging Germany, Japan, France, Russia, and the United States. Based on the need for economy, successive Chancellors of the Exchequer pressed for cooperating with the contenders. Members of the services and Conservatives pushed to punish these contenders, countering that Britain could afford the rising naval expenditure needed to implement such a programme. The existing literature emphasizes the role of geopolitics, domestic constraints, and individual idiosyncrasies to explain Britain's foreign policy adjustment. I argue that the nature of the foreign commercial policy of the contenders guided Britain's response. Due to the special affinity among commercially liberal states, Britain cooperated with America and Japan, ceding regional governance to both aspiring regional hegemons. Britain did, however, punish non-liberal France, Germany, and Russia by implementing new naval construction programmes and concentrating freed-up military resources until these countries capitulated in their naval challenge.

Binding Prometheus: How the 19th Century Expansion of Trade Impeded Britain's Ability to Raise an Army

“…First, foreign naval construction and the growing financial burden of British naval power undermined Britain's naval dominance. This development prompted Britain to engage in a series of naval arms races, redeploy the navy from the western Atlantic, Pacific, and Mediterranean to the island's home waters, and establish naval understandings with France andJapan~Kennedy, 1976, 1980;Friedberg, 1988;Lobell, 2001!. It also substantially raised doubts about the navy's ability to defend the home islands and the army's ability to repel an invasion.…”

“…Since the mid-1990s a growing number of studies have explored how international economic forces shape the security politics of states~e.g., Mansfield, 1994;Liberman, 1996;Copeland, 1996;Papayoanou, 1999;Lobell, 2001!. Despite this resurgence in scholarly interest, the theoretical linkages between economics and security remain underdeveloped.…”

“…Scholars now recognize that the deep division in international relations between international political economy and international security was an artifact of the Cold War~Mastanduno, 1998;Kirshner, 1998!. Since the mid-1990s a growing number of studies have explored how international economic forces shape the security politics of states~e.g., Mansfield, 1994;Liberman, 1996;Copeland, 1996;Papayoanou, 1999;Lobell, 2001!. Despite this resurgence in scholarly interest, the theoretical linkages between economics and security remain underdeveloped.…”

The return on social bonds

“…Finally, while much of the traditional deterrence literature focuses on conflict, the deterring effects of social hierarchy extends to economic foreign policy as well. Lobell (2001), for example, contends that Great Britain considered foreign commercial policies when determining whether to punish contending states that challenged its interests in Europe. The same ideational factors which influence conflict deterrence also affect economic deterrence.…”

“…Sanction Acquiesce In order to access whether there is variation between dominant states, I extend the previous analysis to cases involving Great Britain-widely acknowledged as the world's leading power and hegemon from the eighteenth through early twentieth centuries (e.g., Ferguson, 2002;Lobell, 2001;Krasner, 1976;Thompson, 1988Thompson, , 1995.…”