China, the European Union and the Fragile World Order

Abstract

The EU (European Union) and China are the two arguably most unusual powers in today's world: the EU as the most integrated regional association of states and China as the largest developing great power. As the post-Cold War American-led liberal world order is facing challenges from forces unleashed by the power transition and power diffusion in the international system, this article will look into the order-shaping roles of the EU and China, to identify their respective visions of a desirable world order and to conceptualize how the EU and China can make themselves 'building blocks' of a working world order through parallel, complementary and concerted order-shaping.Keywords: China; the EU; World Order; Sovereignty; Order-shapingThe world is changing and the world order seems to be in flux. If there was a prevailing 'American-led liberal hegemonic order' since the end of the Cold War, as John Ikenberry argued, that order is now in crisis. For Ikenberry, this crisis is one of authority or governance, but not of the basic principles of the liberal order. Therefore, he argues, with minor changes this order could be resurrected (Ikenberry, 2011). By contrast Henry Kissinger, in his book on world order, believed that this world order will be adapted to the new reality in the world. The pressing challenge for the human kind -or, in his words, 'the mystery to be overcome' -shared by all peoples is 'how divergent historic experiences and values can be shaped into a common order' (Kissinger, 2014, p. 9). Reflecting on the Ukraine crisis, prominent world figures have been concerned about the threatening scenario of a world in disorder. Former Soviet leader Gorbachev raised the question of whether the world is entering 'A New Cold War Order' (Gorbachev, 2015). Moreover, Kofi Annan, former secretary-general of the United Nations, made an appeal to world leaders to save the global order (Annan, 2015).This article discusses the current challenges facing a working world order, then investigates how the European Union (EU) and China, the two most unusual powers and key order-shapers in today's world, envisage a desirable world order from their own respective perspectives. The article will also discuss how the EU and China can collaborate in their order-shaping efforts to ensure a more peaceful and more progressive world order. I. World Order, Reorder and DisorderIn analysing the order of today's world, some scholars prefer to use the term 'international order'. In Oran Young's definition, 'International orders are broad framework arrangements governing the activities of all (or almost all) the members of international society over a wide range of specific issues' (Young, 1989, p. 13). To operationalize

A Liberal Institutionalist Perspective on China-EU Relations

“…The fact that key institutions of global economic and financial governance have been dominated by the United States and the EU, with an informal arrangement that reserves the leadership of the World Bank Presidency for an American and of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for the Europeans, has caused considerable rancor among emerging countries, including China. China, together with others, pushed for reform of the IMF in 2010, but when this "reordering from within" failed to deliver results, it switched to a different "reordering from outside" strategy (Chen 2015). This new strategy of setting up alternative multilateral institutions outside the liberal order includes the New Development Bank (set up together with fellow BRICS [Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa] states) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) (set up together with other Asian countries).…”

Rethinking the Rise of China and Its Implications on International Order

“…Although stressing the importance of the need to reform the institutions of the liberal international order to better reflect the interests of the developing countries, China, in the late twentieth century, became part of this order and acted as an 'order-taker' while at the same time keeping a low profile and concentrating its efforts on the continuation of Deng Xiaoping's policy of 'reform and opening' (Chen, 2016). Although this order was designed by and for Western powers, it did nevertheless give China the opportunity for global engagement (Men et al, 2020).…”

Europe, the End of the West and Global Power Shifts

“…The broad literature on global order has identified the deeper roots of divisions within the international community and the challenges to Western liberalism. One reason is the failure to reform the global institution of the ‘American‐led hierarchical liberal order’ (Chen, , pp. 776–777), which consequently led to creation of alternative regional institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the failed military interventions in Iraq or Afghanistan, and the extension of globalisation processes encompassing the fields of economics, finance, technology, communication and security.…”

“…In 2014, the annexation of Crimea by Russia led to questioning the resilience and persistence of the rules-based security order in Europe (for instance, Schwarzer and Stel-zenm€ uller, 2014;Chen, 2016). Mikhail Gorbachev (2015) has suggested that the world is entering 'a new Cold War order' while Kofi Annan (2015) has called for global leaders to save the global order, identifying the annexation of Crimea, the wars in Syria and Iraq, climate change and international trade as issues that could divide the international state community along new battle lines.…”

“…Consequently, the relative decline of its weight in the world features prominently in discussions of the consequences of global power shifts. America's global reputation suffered, in particular, after the failed military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan and the 2008 recession (Chen, 2016).…”