China’s Decision to Deploy HYSY-981 in the South China Sea: Bureaucratic Politics with Chinese Characteristics

Long, Yingxian

doi:10.1080/14799855.2016.1227322

Cited by 10 publications

(6 citation statements)

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“…64–67). By framing that the bilateral relations between China and Vietnam are too important to be side-lined by the oil rig incident, leaders actually attempted to reason with their domestic audiences, especially the elites (Long, 2016). Correspondingly, the leaders have reiterated that it is within China’s national interests that good neighbourliness should prevail in the region (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People’s Republic of China, 2017a).…”

Section: When Inconsistency Is Tolerablementioning

confidence: 99%

Is Assertiveness Paying the Bill? China’s Domestic Audience Costs in the South China Sea Disputes

Ramadhani

2019

Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs

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China's assertiveness in the South China Sea has drawn international attention, especially in the past decade. Yet China has not always resorted to assertive foreign policy. Efforts to de-escalate tension are evident despite the domestic preference for tougher action. This study centres on a question: what makes for China's assertiveness. I argue that China's assertive foreign policy originates in leaders' domestic consideration. Utilizing audience costs theory I focus on two assumptions that need to be relaxed: unitary domestic audiences and consistency in leaders' crisis behaviour. China's non-unitary domestic audiences, namely the elites and public, have different interests, although they share support for assertiveness in the South China Sea. Domestic audiences can tolerate inconsistency insofar as leaders are able to justify their decision, that is, to de-escalate the South China Sea disputes without dropping assertiveness. Foreign policy decision-making in China remains somewhat opaque, but domestic audiences can influence the process albeit not directly. In this regard, China's assertiveness serves to generate audience costs so as to underpin regime legitimacy.

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Section: When Inconsistency Is Tolerablementioning

confidence: 99%

Is Assertiveness Paying the Bill? China’s Domestic Audience Costs in the South China Sea Disputes

Ramadhani

2019

Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs

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“…Numerous scholars and pundits have analyzed China's policy in the SCS disputes from traditional perspectives of history, security strategy, rivalry with other major powers, Sino-ASEAN relations, domestic nationalism, and material interests such as energy and fishing resources (Ang, 2000;Ba, 2011;Buszynski, 2012;Feng & He, 2018;Fravel, 2011;Goldstein, 2011;Hoo, 2017;Hyer, 1995;Rahman & Tsamenyi, 2010;Weissmann, 2010Weissmann, , 2015aYahuda, 2003;Yoshihara & Holmes, 2011). A few studies have attempted to unpack the role of various sub-state actors in China's SCS policy (Garver, 1992;International Crisis Group, 2012;Jakobson, 2014;Long, 2016;Wong, 2018). Garver (1992), for instance, argues that the Chinese military played the most important role in Beijing's SCS operations in the 1980s and its activism was mainly motivated by a desire for a bigger budget.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…By 2014, three major oil companies in China had made plans to exploit the energy resources in the SCS: (a) CNPC registered 18 blocks with a total area of 126,848 square kilometers, (b) SINOPEC registered three blocks with a total area of 10,573 square kilometers, and (c) CNOOC registered 82 blocks with a total area of 541,982 square kilometers (W. Li, ). In addition to the energy sector, Hainan’s pursuit of economic interests in the SCS is supported by the Chinese military (Garver, ; Long, ), the tourism sector (Gong, ; Wong, ), law enforcement agencies, and the propaganda machinery (Jakobson, ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For many years, China managed to expand its presence in the SCS in at least five ways: (a) diplomatic statements on sovereignty and rights in SCS, (b) occupation and control over the Paracels, (c) occupation of seven rocks and reefs in Spratlys, (d) fishing activities in many parts of the SCS, and (e) occasional patrols by Chinese navy and law enforcement vessels. When it comes to sovereignty, defense, and responses to actual conflicts, there is no doubt that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), especially the Navy, has played the most important role (Garver, ; Long, ). In this context, the local government did not play a notable role in China’s defense matters in the SCS in past decades.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Hainan Province in China’s South China Sea Policy: What Role Does the Local Government Play?

Li¹

2019

Asian Politics and Policy

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This article explores the role of the local government in Hainan Province in Beijing’s policy in the South China Sea (SCS) disputes. The article argues that Hainan has played three major roles in the SCS disputes: an avid defender of China’s claim and position, an active definer of China’s interests in the disputes, and a helpful participant in asserting China’s national security in the SCS. The establishment of the Sansha city has significantly increased Hainan’s involvement in the SCS contestations. This article concludes that Beijing’s policy in the SCS is unlikely to become significantly more moderate partly because of Hainan’s strong position on the dispute and keen interest in the resources in the area. The article also recommends incorporating the views and activities of local governments in future studies on Chinese foreign and security policy.

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“…If particular actors stray too far from the party line, International Affairs 94: 3, 2018 top leaders can deploy their control mechanisms, disciplining or purging cadres, issuing tighter guidelines or seeking to recentralize authority. However, these mechanisms are never fully successful, as can be seen in continued struggles over foreign policy, 40 and non-implementation of Xi's policies, even as he cracks down on corruption and seeks to recentralize power. 41 Indeed, the extensive deployment of these mechanisms puts at risk the functioning and even the survival of the party-state itself.…”

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confidence: 99%

China challenges global governance? Chinese international development finance and the AIIB

Hameiri¹,

Jones²

2018

International Affairs

105

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China challenges global governance? Chinese international development finance and the AIIB SHAHAR HAMEIRI AND LEE JONES * Scholars and policy-makers have been increasingly debating the potential impact of rising powers on the architecture and outputs of global governance, with particular reference to China-the most important emerging power. 1 This discussion overlaps with a broader debate over whether China is a 'status quo' power that will maintain the post-Second World War 'international liberal order', or a 'revisionist' state seeking to overturn this order. 2 Much of this debate has focused on existing multilateral institutions, where 'gridlock' is frequently blamed on rising powers' obsession with state sovereignty and/or demands for greater status and respect for their interests and agendas. 3 Many perceive a growing challenge to US domination of these institutions, and a tendency to establish new ones that 'perform a similar function' but are more responsive to emerging powers' demands. 4 This is taken by some to denote a growing challenge to the international liberal order, particularly from China. 5 * We would like to thank Jeffrey Wilson and the editors and reviewers of International Affairs for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. We would also like to thank Zhang Tong for his research assistance and Ryan Smith for assisting with copyediting. Responsibility for the final version is of course solely ours. We gratefully acknowledge generous funding for this project provided through Australian Research Council Discovery Project grant DP170102647 'Rising Powers and State Transformation'. 1 See e.g. Miles Kahler, 'Rising powers and global governance: negotiating change in a resilient status quo',

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China’s Decision to Deploy HYSY-981 in the South China Sea: Bureaucratic Politics with Chinese Characteristics

Cited by 10 publications

References 0 publications

Is Assertiveness Paying the Bill? China’s Domestic Audience Costs in the South China Sea Disputes

Is Assertiveness Paying the Bill? China’s Domestic Audience Costs in the South China Sea Disputes

Hainan Province in China’s South China Sea Policy: What Role Does the Local Government Play?

China challenges global governance? Chinese international development finance and the AIIB

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