China's assertiveness in the South China Sea has drawn international attention, especially in the past decade. Yet China has not always resorted to assertive foreign policy. Efforts to de-escalate tension are evident despite the domestic preference for tougher action. This study centres on a question: what makes for China's assertiveness. I argue that China's assertive foreign policy originates in leaders' domestic consideration. Utilizing audience costs theory I focus on two assumptions that need to be relaxed: unitary domestic audiences and consistency in leaders' crisis behaviour. China's non-unitary domestic audiences, namely the elites and public, have different interests, although they share support for assertiveness in the South China Sea. Domestic audiences can tolerate inconsistency insofar as leaders are able to justify their decision, that is, to de-escalate the South China Sea disputes without dropping assertiveness. Foreign policy decision-making in China remains somewhat opaque, but domestic audiences can influence the process albeit not directly. In this regard, China's assertiveness serves to generate audience costs so as to underpin regime legitimacy.
Indonesia has long historical relations with China. The Chinese—mostly merchants— arrived much earlier than the Dutch, although no written records are available as to the exact date of their arrival. After Indonesia proclaimed independence in 1945, the Chinese found themselves in a precarious position. The anti-China narrative was played up to bolster the impression that the pribumi was somewhat threatened. This article centers on the use of anti-China narrative in election campaigns, surveys on millennial voting behavior and political preferences. It aims to provide descriptive explanation of how Indonesian millennials are contextualized within domestic political constellation, focusing on the use of identity politics in election campaigns.
The study of political decision-making cannot exclude the actors involved in the process. Neither can it disregard the interplay between decision-makers and political institution where they operate. This article aims to explain how perception of survival affects decision-making by focusing on leaders, specifically by analysing Benigno S. Aquino III’s leadership (2010–2016). Built on political psychology, I will show that motivation to maintain power may bias leaders’ reasoning leading to suboptimal decision. Accountability can help leaders mitigate bias, or de-bias, by stimulating their use of cognitive complexity. But the same effort may backfire and make leaders resort to heuristics instead. Where leaders end up in the cognitive spectrum depends on the types of audiences to whom they feel accountable: core (the ruling elites and loyal voters) and external (the opposition and its supporters) audiences. Preoccupation with core audiences can make leaders downplay the opposition challenge. Furthermore, leaders’ perceived understanding of their support base may be erroneous. The result is overconfidence in their perception of survival. I argue that President Aquino’s misperception of survival was rooted in his belief that (1) Filipinos would like to have his legacy continued and that (2) his popularity would help his successor Manuel Araneta Roxas II win the 2016 presidential race. This overconfidence turned out to be detrimental. Roxas’s electoral loss to Rodrigo Duterte put an end to the Daang Matuwid, President Aquino’s good governance platform.
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