Children’s developing metaethical judgments

Schmidt, Marco F. H.; Gonzalez-Cabrera, Ivan; Tomasello, Michael

doi:10.1016/j.jecp.2017.07.008

Cited by 20 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 59 publications

(87 reference statements)

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“…They are objective about their known worlds. Later, school-age children come to understand that there may be other sociomoral worlds with their own norms (Schmidt et al 2017).…”

Section: A Shared Intentionality Accountmentioning

confidence: 99%

The moral psychology of obligation

2019

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Although psychologists have paid scant attention to the sense of obligation as a distinctly human motivation, moral philosophers have identified two of its key features: First, it has a peremptory, demanding force, with a kind of coercive quality, and second, it is often tied to agreement-like social interactions (e.g., promises) in which breaches prompt normative protest, on the one side, and apologies, excuses, justifications, and guilt on the other. Drawing on empirical research in comparative and developmental psychology, I provide here a psychological foundation for these unique features by showing that the human sense of obligation is intimately connected developmentally with the formation of a shared agent “we,” which not only directs collaborative efforts but also self-regulates them. Thus, children's sense of obligation is first evident inside, but not outside, of collaborative activities structured by joint agency with a partner, and it is later evident in attitudes toward in-group, but not out-group, members connected by collective agency. When you and I voluntarily place our fate in one another's hands in interdependent collaboration – scaled up to our lives together in an interdependent cultural group – this transforms the instrumental pressure that individuals feel when pursuing individual goals into the pressure that “we” put on me (who needs to preserve my cooperative identity in this “we”) to live up to our shared expectations: a we > me self-regulation. The human sense of obligation may therefore be seen as a kind of self-conscious motivation.

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“…They are objective about their known worlds. Later, school-age children come to understand that there may be other sociomoral worlds with their own norms (Schmidt et al 2017).…”

Section: A Shared Intentionality Accountmentioning

confidence: 99%

The moral psychology of obligation

2019

Self Cite

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“…For example, utilizing the same disagreement and truth‐aptness measures as Goodwin and Darley, Wright, Grandjean, and McWhite (), Wright, McWhite, and Grandjean (), and Wright () found similarly high degrees of variation in subjects' objectivist versus nonobjectivist interpretation of moral statements. Sarkissian, Park, Tien, Wright, and Knobe's () disagreement‐based study has recently been successfully replicated in children (Schmidt, Gonzalez‐Cabrera, & Tomasello, ) and adults (Gonzalez‐Cabrera, personal communication, manuscript in progress) as well.…”

Section: Worriesmentioning

confidence: 93%

Empirical research on folk moral objectivism

Pölzler

Wright

2019

Philosophy Compass

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Lay persons may have intuitions about morality's objectivity. What do these intuitions look like? And what are their causes and consequences? In recent years, an increasing number of scholars have begun to investigate these questions empirically. This article presents and assesses the resulting area of research as well as its potential philosophical implications. First, we introduce the methods of empirical research on folk moral objectivism. Second, we provide an overview of the findings that have so far been made. Third, we raise a number of methodological worries that cast doubt upon these findings. And fourth, we discuss ways in which lay persons' intuitions about moral objectivity may bear on philosophical claims.

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“…They are objective about their known worlds. Later, school-age children come to understand that there may be other sociomoral worlds with their own norms (Schmidt et al 2017).…”

Section: Social Normsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The moral obligations of conflict and resistance

Killen

Dahl

2020

Behav Brain Sci

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Morality has two key features: (1) moral judgments are not solely determined by what your group thinks, and (2) moral judgments are often applied to members of other groups as well as your own group. Cooperative motives do not explain how young children reject unfairness, and assert moral obligations, both inside and outside their groups. Resistance and experience with conflicts, alongside cooperation, is key to the emergence and development of moral obligation.

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Children’s developing metaethical judgments

Cited by 20 publications

References 59 publications

The moral psychology of obligation

The moral psychology of obligation

Empirical research on folk moral objectivism

The moral obligations of conflict and resistance

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