The moral psychology of obligation

Abstract

Although psychologists have paid scant attention to the sense of obligation as a distinctly human motivation, moral philosophers have identified two of its key features: First, it has a peremptory, demanding force, with a kind of coercive quality, and second, it is often tied to agreement-like social interactions (e.g., promises) in which breaches prompt normative protest, on the one side, and apologies, excuses, justifications, and guilt on the other. Drawing on empirical research in comparative and developmental psychology, I provide here a psychological foundation for these unique features by showing that the human sense of obligation is intimately connected developmentally with the formation of a shared agent “we,” which not only directs collaborative efforts but also self-regulates them. Thus, children's sense of obligation is first evident inside, but not outside, of collaborative activities structured by joint agency with a partner, and it is later evident in attitudes toward in-group, but not out-group, members connected by collective agency. When you and I voluntarily place our fate in one another's hands in interdependent collaboration – scaled up to our lives together in an interdependent cultural group – this transforms the instrumental pressure that individuals feel when pursuing individual goals into the pressure that “we” put on me (who needs to preserve my cooperative identity in this “we”) to live up to our shared expectations: a we > me self-regulation. The human sense of obligation may therefore be seen as a kind of self-conscious motivation.

Categories convey prescriptive information across domains and development

“…One possible explanation for this asymmetrical activation is that visual cues to kind membership differed between the two domains. Whereas people differed only in clothing color, which alone does not mark category boundaries (e.g., Baldwin, 1989) Prescriptive judgments likely serve different functions for social and biological categories-whereas prescriptive reasoning about social groups might help children to regulate their own and others' behavior (Rakoczy & Schmidt, 2013;Tomasello, 2019a;2019b), prescriptive reasoning about non-social categories like animals would not serve the same function. For this reason, in Study 2 we also explored people's intuitions about the consequences of nonconformity across the social and biological domains.…”

“…Children think about and try to enforce category-related prescriptive expectations from early in development (e.g., saying that boys cannot wear pink, that babies should drink milk, and so on). This kind of prescriptive social reasoning is often described as developing in the context of children's early social interactions (Piaget, 1932;Rakoczy & Schmidt, 2013;Rakoczy et al, 2008;Rutland, Killen, & Abrams, 2010;Searle, 1995;Smetana, 1981;Tomasello, 2019a;2019b). Yet, children (and adults) also reason prescriptively outside of the social domain (e.g., thinking that dogs should bark, and that there is something wrong with a dog that does not; Haward et al, 2018;Prasada & Dillingham, 2006;.…”

“…Indeed, an early focus on prescriptive norms has been observed across a range of contexts-from cooperative games to tool use-all involving the behavior of humans interacting with one another (e.g., Schmidt et al, 2016;Tworek & Cimpian, 2016). From this perspective, children's early prescriptive reasoning might emerge as an integral aspect of their social cognitive development, perhaps arising through children's own social interactions (Piaget, 1932;Rakoczy & Schmidt, 2013;Rakoczy et al, 2008;Rutland et al, 2010;Searle, 1995;Smetana, 1981;Tomasello, 2019a;2019b). For example, Tomasello (2019a;2019b) proposes that children's understanding of prescriptive social norms develops first through their own experiences of shared agency in the context of collaboration with social partners, which they then later generalize outward to construct a more general abstract sense of prescriptive norms across whole groups.…”

“…From this perspective, children's early prescriptive reasoning might emerge as an integral aspect of their social cognitive development, perhaps arising through children's own social interactions (Piaget, 1932;Rakoczy & Schmidt, 2013;Rakoczy et al, 2008;Rutland et al, 2010;Searle, 1995;Smetana, 1981;Tomasello, 2019a;2019b). For example, Tomasello (2019a;2019b) proposes that children's understanding of prescriptive social norms develops first through their own experiences of shared agency in the context of collaboration with social partners, which they then later generalize outward to construct a more general abstract sense of prescriptive norms across whole groups. Children three years of age and older then use these social norms to regulate their own behavior-and the behavior of others-via cognitive processes of collective intentionality that are uniquely human (Tomasello, 2019a;2019b).…”

“…For example, Tomasello (2019a;2019b) proposes that children's understanding of prescriptive social norms develops first through their own experiences of shared agency in the context of collaboration with social partners, which they then later generalize outward to construct a more general abstract sense of prescriptive norms across whole groups. Children three years of age and older then use these social norms to regulate their own behavior-and the behavior of others-via cognitive processes of collective intentionality that are uniquely human (Tomasello, 2019a;2019b). Similarly, Rakoczy and Schmidt (2013) define social norms as arbitrary conventions that exert prescriptive force on all participants in a community in context-relative ways.…”