Characterising Theories of Time and Modality

Deasy, Daniel

doi:10.1111/phib.12147

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 27 publications

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“…However, contemporary research on the topic suggests that expressions of the form 'x exists at t' are inherently ambiguous (Correia and Rosenkranz 2019;Deasy 2019;Markosian 2014): on one reading, they are equivalent to expressions of the form 'x is located at t'; whereas on another reading, they are equivalent to expressions of the form 'at t, x is something'. Thus, on the first reading, 'x exists at t' is understood in locational terms, such that to say that something exists at a time is to make a claim about where things are located in time; on the second reading, 'x exists at t' is understood in perspectival terms, such that to say that something exists at a time t is to make a claim about what there is relative to (i.e.…”

Section: Existential Change and The B-theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Postoji li promjena prema B-teoriji vremena?

Banfi

2021

EuJAP

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The purpose of this paper is to explore the connection between change and the B-theory of time, sometimes also called the Scientific view of time, according to which reality is a four-dimensional spacetime manifold, where past, present and future things equally exist, and the present time and non-present times are metaphysically the same. I argue in favour of a novel response to the much-vexed question of whether there is change on the B-theory or not. In fact, B-theorists are often said to hold a ‘static’ view of time. But this far from being innocent label: if the B-theory of time presents a model of temporal reality that is static, then there is no change on the B-theory. From this, one can reasonably think as follows: of course, there is change, so the B-theory must be false. What I plan to do in this paper is to argue that in some sense there is change on the B-theory, but in some other sense, there is no change on the B-theory. To do so, I present three instances of change: Existential Change, namely the view that things change with respect to their existence over time; Qualitative Change, the view that things change with respect to how they are over time; Propositional Change, namely the view that things (i.e. propositions) change with respect to truth value over time. I argue that while there is a reading of these three instances of change that is true on the B-theory, and so there is change on the B-theory in this sense, there is a B-theoretical reading of each of them that is not true on the B-theory, and therefore there is no change on the B-theory in this other sense.

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Section: Existential Change and The B-theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Postoji li promjena prema B-teoriji vremena?

Banfi

2021

EuJAP

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Quineanism, Noneism and Metaphysical Equivalence

Jacinto,

Belastegui

2023

Stud Logica

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In this paper we propose and defend the Synonymy account, a novel account of metaphysical equivalence which draws on the idea (Rayo in The Construction of Logical Space, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013) that part of what it is to formulate a theory is to lay down a theoretical hypothesis concerning logical space. Roughly, two theories are synonymous—and so, in our view, equivalent—just in case (i) they take the same propositions to stand in the same entailment relations, and (ii) they are committed to the truth of the same propositions. Furthermore, we put our proposal to work by showing that it affords a better and more nuanced understanding of the debate between Quineans and noneists. Finally we show how the Synonymy account fares better than some of its competitors, specifically, McSweeney’s (Philosophical Perspectives 30(1):270–293, 2016) epistemic account and Miller’s (Philosophical Quarterly 67(269):772–793, 2017) hyperintensional account.

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The rotten core of presentism

Tallant

Ingram

2020

Synthese

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Recently, some have attempted to reformulate debates in first-order metaphysics, particularly in the metaphysics of time and modality, for reasons due to Williamson (Modal logic as metaphysics, Oxford University Press, 2013). In this paper, we focus on the ways in which the likes of Cameron, Correia and Rosenkranz, Deasy, Ingram, Tallant, Viebahn, inter alia, have initiated and responded to attempts to capture the core of presentism using a formal, logical machinery. We argue that such attempts are doomed to fail because there is no theoretical core to presentism. There is no single view or family of views that is presentism.

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Characterising Theories of Time and Modality

Cited by 4 publications

References 27 publications

Postoji li promjena prema B-teoriji vremena?

Postoji li promjena prema B-teoriji vremena?

Quineanism, Noneism and Metaphysical Equivalence

The rotten core of presentism

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