Chapter 5 The EU Budget: How much Scope for Institutional Reform?

Enderlein, Henrik; Lindner, Johannes; Calvo-Gonzales, Oscar; Ritter, Raymond

doi:10.1016/s0573-8555(06)79005-8

Cited by 25 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…As has been pointed out by Enderlein et al. (2005) in an ECB Discussion Paper, a further development of the EU's public finances has to go hand in hand with the development of the EU as a political entity.…”

Section: The Structure Of a New Budgetary Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bringing Macroeconomics into the EU Budget Debate: Why and How?

Dullien

Schwarzer

2008

J of Common Market Studies

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The EMU has been designed without an instrument for automatic fiscal stabilization on the European level. This article highlights the seriousness of this lacuna by new empirical data, which suggest that fiscal stabilization at the national level has also worked insufficiently. This situation will hamper the EU's efforts to achieve the targets set by the Lisbon Agenda: recent theoretical contributions suggest that a positive macroeconomic environment is a prerequisite for productivity growth and structural reform which form the centrepiece of the Agenda. There are thus strong economic arguments for rethinking the set-up for fiscal stabilization policies in the EMU. We suggest three remedies for the underperformance of the automatic stabilizers: making EU expenditure sensitive to the cyclical situation of the recipient country, introducing an EU corporate tax upon the upcoming revision of the EU budget before 2013 and/or setting up a European unemployment scheme.

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Section: The Structure Of a New Budgetary Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bringing Macroeconomics into the EU Budget Debate: Why and How?

Dullien

Schwarzer

2008

J of Common Market Studies

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“…As a consequence, the Council has slowly and with considerable reservation come to terms with the presence of the Parliament in this policy field (Laffan, 1997, p. 89) and the Parliament has gradually, although informally, extended its political competence over the whole budget (Enderlein et al 2005). We conclude on the relevance of informal institutions (Goodin, 2000;Farrell-Héritier, 2003), showing in detail how the particular formal setting chosen in the Treaty invited their emergence to avoid deadlock situations.…”

Section: Solving the Budgetary Deadlocks: Formal And Informal Institumentioning

confidence: 81%

Reforming the EU Budgetary Procedure: Is Codecision a Step Forward?

Giuriato¹

2008

CESifo Economic Studies

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“…At the end of this intergovernmental process, the European Council has to arrive at a unanimous decision on the framework. The final agreement, however, is only reached after a further negotiation process involving the Council of Ministers, the European Commission and the European Parliament, which results in an inter‐institutional agreement between the three players (Enderlein et al ., 2005, p. 16).…”

Section: Negotiating the Financial Perspective 2007–13mentioning

confidence: 99%

Bargaining Power and Negotiation Tactics: The Negotiations on the EU's Financial Perspective, 2007–13

Dür

Mateo

2010

J of Common Market Studies

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We argue that in intergovernmental negotiations in the European Union, large Member States, countries with a good alternative to negotiated agreement and governments facing domestic constraints are more likely to resort to a hard bargaining strategy than less powerful Member States. We test this prediction with data from a survey with high-level officials from all EU Member States for the case of the negotiations concerning the EU Financial Perspective 2007-13. The evidence provides support for our argument and casts doubt on studies that suggest either that there are no differences in bargaining strategies across EU member countries or that the main differences exist between old and new EU Member States. Copyright (c) 2010 The Author(s). Journal compilation (c) 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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Chapter 5 The EU Budget: How much Scope for Institutional Reform?

Cited by 25 publications

References 9 publications

Bringing Macroeconomics into the EU Budget Debate: Why and How?

Bringing Macroeconomics into the EU Budget Debate: Why and How?

Reforming the EU Budgetary Procedure: Is Codecision a Step Forward?

Bargaining Power and Negotiation Tactics: The Negotiations on the EU's Financial Perspective, 2007–13

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