Reforming the EU Budgetary Procedure: Is Codecision a Step Forward?

Giuriato, Luisa

doi:10.1093/cesifo/ifn034

Cited by 6 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 26 publications

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“…Benedetto (2011) concludes that the Lisbon reforms weaken the EP's ability to reform the budget. Giuriato (2009) also questions the EP's gains under the new procedure. Furthermore, Benedetto (2013) argues that the new budgetary procedure can lead to a breakdown of negotiations between the Council and the EP and thus to budgetary status quos.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The budgetary procedure in the European Union and the implications of the Treaty of Lisbon

Crombez

Høyland

2014

European Union Politics

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The Treaty of Lisbon reformed the budgetary process in the European Union. We present a game-theoretical analysis and an empirical evaluation of the new annual budgetary procedure. We find that the procedure operates much like the ordinary legislative procedure, and puts the European Parliament on an equal footing with the Council. Given the prevailing preference configuration, our empirical analysis shows that the European Parliament does not derive power from its veto right. Any voting coalition that commands a qualified majority in the Council includes a majority of the Members of the European Parliament. However, the European Parliament does derive power from its amendment and proposal rights. Furthermore, we conclude that the procedure is poorly designed and can lead to the breakdown of negotiations.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%