Chapter 33 A Primer on Foreclosure

Rey, Patrick; Tirole, Jean

doi:10.1016/s1573-448x(06)03033-0

Cited by 432 publications

(334 citation statements)

References 82 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

320

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…According to Rey and Tirole (2007) a case of foreclosure is a dominant firm's denial of access to an essential facility with the intent of extending market power from one segment of the market (the bottleneck segment) to an adjacent segment (the competitive segment). By treating some group of customers preferentially and offer less attractive terms to others firms can achieve the same results as a vertically integrated firm even without vertically integrating.…”

Section: V21 Blocking and Degradationmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Competition and antitrust in Internet markets

Haucap

Stühmeier²

2016

Handbook on the Economics of the Internet

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The working papers published in the Series constitute work in progress circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comments. Views expressed represent exclusively the authors' own opinions and do not necessarily reflect those of the editor. Finally, policy conclusions and further research questions are discussed in the paper's concluding section. Terms of use: Documents inKeywords: Digital markets, Google, E-Book, online markets, net neutrality, vertical restraints + We would like to thank Johannes Bauer for his extremely valuable comments on a draft of this chapter.

show abstract

Section: V21 Blocking and Degradationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…13 See, e.g, Whinston (1990). Ahlborn et al (2004) and Rey and Tirole (2007) In Europe, broadband markets are less concentrated than in the US (see Krämer, Wiewiorra and Weinhardt, 2013). This may explain the European Commission's cautious view on any ex ante regulation of ISPs.…”

Section: V21 Blocking and Degradationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Competition and antitrust in Internet markets

Haucap

Stühmeier²

2016

Handbook on the Economics of the Internet

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…When an integrated operator owns access to essential content, it may not allow at all the distribution of that content to rival distributors (so-called "refusal to deal") and/or it may negotiate prices that raise rival distributors' costs. Rey and Tirole (2007) call these "complete" and "partial foreclosure." Riordan (2008) summarizes the theoretical justification for concerns about vertical integration in general.…”

Section: Vertical Integration and Foreclosurementioning

confidence: 99%

The Economics of Television and Online Video Markets

Crawford

2015

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Television is the dominant entertainment medium for hundreds of millions. This chapter surveys the economic forces that determine the production and consumption of this content. It presents recent trends in television and online video markets, both in the US and internationally, and describes the state of theoretical and empirical research on these industries. A number of distinct themes emerge, including the growing importance of the pay-television sector, the role played by content providers (channels), distributors, and negotiations between them in determining market outcomes, and concerns about the effects of market power throughout this vertical structure. It also covers important but unsettled topics including the purpose for and effects of both the old (Public Service Broadcasters) and the new (online video markets). Open theoretical and empirical research questions are highlighted throughout. JEL: L82, L86, L32, M37, C72, D40, L40, L50

show abstract

“…8i; 8j, we solve the following system of the FOCs (19) and (20) for all regions and cities simultaneously: 1 4 At the symmetric equilibrium, we know that 0 ij @r ij…”

Section: Comparison Of the Nash Equilibria At The Symmetric Equilibriummentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A parallelism can also be made with the industrial organization literature on mergers of …rms, for which a great deal has been produced (e.g., Salant et al, 1983, Spengler, 1950, Gaudet and Van Long, 1996, Ordover et al, 1990 for some seminal papers). For vertical mergers alone, more than 500 papers exist (see Rey and Tirole, 2007, for a survey). This attention of scholars is justi…ed by the complexity of this practical issue, both to the extent of the determinants of mergers and to the range of e¤ects of mergers on consumer prices.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Mergers in fiscal federalism

Breuillé

Zanaj

2013

Journal of Public Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper analyzes mergers of regions in a two-tier setting with both horizontal and vertical tax competition. The merger of regions induces three e¤ects on regional and local tax policies, which are transmitted both horizontally and vertically: i) an alleviation of tax competition at the regional level, ii) a rise in the regional tax base, and iii) a larger internalization of tax externalities generated by cities. It is shown that the merger of regions increases regional tax rates while decreasing local tax rates. This Nash equilibrium with mergers is then compared with the Nash equilibrium with coalitions of regions.

show abstract

Chapter 33 A Primer on Foreclosure

Cited by 432 publications

References 82 publications

Competition and antitrust in Internet markets

Competition and antitrust in Internet markets

The Economics of Television and Online Video Markets

Mergers in fiscal federalism

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About