Competition and antitrust in Internet markets

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The working papers published in the Series constitute work in progress circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comments. Views expressed represent exclusively the authors' own opinions and do not necessarily reflect those of the editor. Finally, policy conclusions and further research questions are discussed in the paper's concluding section. Terms of use: Documents inKeywords: Digital markets, Google, E-Book, online markets, net neutrality, vertical restraints + We would like to thank Johannes Bauer for his extremely valuable comments on a draft of this chapter.

Drivers of Article Processing Charges in Open Access

“…Hence, hybrid-OA strategy is an instrument used by established publishers to maintain their profit, which can also be considered as an indicator of market power. If publishers follow these incentives, bigger publishers (with more market power through bigger bundles of journals) can be expected to charge higher APC than smaller publishers because the incentive to delay the open access innovation should be particularly strong (since they have more to lose), and a big amount of surcharge 6 For general overviews on the economics of platforms/two-sided markets see, inter alia, Rochet and Tirole (2006), Haucap and Stühmeier (2016), Budzinski and Kuchinke (2019). 7 Reasons for such asymmetric effects may be that the connection of subscribers (potential readers), actual readers and citations (the latter being more important for authors than the former) is rather weak (Armstrong, 2015) and/or that authors care more about the quality signal of publishing in a high-ranked journal than about readership volume.…”

Stars in social media: new light through old windows?

“…or picture(Instagram) watching and commenting.The business model of the currently prominent social media platforms, however, does resemble what modern economics describe as platforms (inter alia;Rochet & Tirole 2003, Armstrong 2006, Anderson & Gabszewicz 2006, Haucap & Stühmeier 2016. Social media platforms as suppliers serve three different customer groups: (i) content providers (commercially and noncommercially) demanding space for and access to their contents, (ii) content users consuming these contents, and (iii) advertisers demanding the attention of content users for the advertised goods.…”

Competition policy reform in Europe and Germany – institutional change in the light of digitization

“…Coming back to digital markets, the above emphasized mutually positive indirect network effects can be found, for instance, on internet platforms like Ebay, Airbnb, Uber and various hotel-booking platforms (Haucap & Stühmeier 2016). There are also cases where network effects only occur in one direction.…”