Competition policy reform in Europe and Germany – institutional change in the light of digitization

Budzinski, Oliver; Stöhr, Annika

doi:10.1080/17441056.2018.1555942

Cited by 20 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…In general, under the assumption of bounded-rational ("naïve") consumers, incentives for abusive strategies (in terms of pricing, anticompetitive conduct, etc.) are increasing with a wider dataset (inter alia, Budzinski & Stöhr 2018b).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Happily Ever After?: Vertical and Horizontal Mergers in the US Media Industry

Stöhr¹,

Noskova²,

Kunz-Kaltenhäuser³

et al. 2020

WOCO

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This article provides an economic analysis of recent vertical and horizontal mergers in the US industry for audio-visual media content, including the AT&T–Time Warner and the Disney– Fox mergers. Using a theory-driven approach, we examine economic effects of these types of mergers on market competition, focusing on digital media content distribution. In doing so, we address three research questions: (1) Is the current development of the industry with its recent merger activity concerning? (2) Would vertical or horizontal integration be more preferable for overall welfare and competition in this industry? (3) What are implications for antitrust policy? We conclude from our analysis that in the already highly horizontally concentrated US market for audio-visual content the process of further vertical integration creates concerns from a competition policy perspective. Moreover, even though horizontal concentration on some of the market stages may be anticompetitive as well, vertical integration is likely to be more harmful. As a consequence, we recommend a stricter approach to vertical merger control in this industry, as well as a more active abuse control against already vertically integrated media companies. competition policy, antitrust, industrial economics, digitization, media economics, institutional economics, industrial organization, mergers, vertical integration, horizontal integration

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Happily Ever After?: Vertical and Horizontal Mergers in the US Media Industry

Stöhr¹,

Noskova²,

Kunz-Kaltenhäuser³

et al. 2020

WOCO

Self Cite

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“…Other research refers to digitalization and Big Data, which, when managed in a shared way, achieve results such as the prediction of behaviors and prediction of searches within a system [40,41]. Research on cultural heritage addresses how digitalization assists in the preservation and conservation of heritage and scientific resources, creating educational opportunities and providing a solution to the world population's access to their heritage.…”

Section: Fields Where Digitization Is Appliedmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fields Touched by Digitalization: Analysis of Scientific Activity in Scopus

Espina-Romero

Alcedo²

2022

Sustainability

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This study aims to analyze the publications in Scopus around digitalization in the space of time between 2018 and 2022. A bibliometric review is carried out with a bibliographic approach for 658 documents, which were processed by RStudio and VOSviewer software. The findings show the ten fields where digitization is most applied: “Archives, Corruption and Economy”, “Industry 4.0, Internet of Things, Sustainability and Big Data”, “Cultural Heritage, Deep Learning, Preservation and BIM”, “Photogrammetry and 3D Digitalization”, “Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Supply Chain Management”, “Augmented Reality, Machine Learning and Virtual Reality”, “Innovation, Business Model and Publishing Industry”, “Algorithms, E-government and Biometrics”, “Digital Collections” and “Healthcare”. It should be noted that this document is based on 88.14% original studies, validating the results obtained, and it is also one of the most updated studies.

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“…Germany, for instance, launched two reform packages to their competition law during the last five years. First, in 2017, the 9 th amendment of the German Competition Act (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, GWB) added explicit reference to the peculiarities of platform economics which now must be considered when delineating a relevant market or when assessing market power (inter alia, Budzinski & Stöhr 2019). Following this, the 10 th amendment from 2021 further extended the emphasis on platform effects and emphasized the crucial role of data in digital markets -both in the assessment of market power (e.g.…”

Section: How the Story Unfoldedmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regulating Big Tech: From Competition Policy to Sector Regulation?

Budzinski

Mendelsohn

2021

SSRN Journal

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The European Commission has proposed a new regulatory tool for the governance of digital markets. The Digital Markets Act (DMA) intents to limit the market behavior of socalled gatekeeper companies to ensure contestable and fair digital markets. We review the provisions of the DMA both from a legal and from an economics perspective. Notwithstanding a number of benefits, we identify several issues with the current proposal. When looking at the core provisions of the proposal from an economic perspective, five issues of contention arise: many of the provisions seem to be quite narrow in scope and it seems difficult to extrapolate more general rules from them; the economic harm of some of the provisions is both uncertain and in principle debatable; the alleged distinction between different types of obligations cannot be verified, and, last but not least, while the DMA seeks to control existing gatekeepers, the "tipping" of markets and the rise of further gatekeepers is not guaranteed by this proposal; this in turn leads to a larger critical analysis of the gatekeeper as DMA's norm addressee. From a legal perspective, the first hurdle is the lack of clarity pertaining to the nature and goals of the DMA, this is further compounded by procedural provisions and an enforcement regime with many uncertainties and loopholes -all of which tend to undermine the intended stringency of the regulation and its overall chances of making digital markets systemically more contestable and fairer. Thus, we think that a reform of the competition policy regime would better suit the need of regulating big tech.

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Competition policy reform in Europe and Germany – institutional change in the light of digitization

Cited by 20 publications

References 35 publications

Happily Ever After?: Vertical and Horizontal Mergers in the US Media Industry

Happily Ever After?: Vertical and Horizontal Mergers in the US Media Industry

Fields Touched by Digitalization: Analysis of Scientific Activity in Scopus

Regulating Big Tech: From Competition Policy to Sector Regulation?

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