The paper applies economic theories to give an overview of the emerging phenomenon of digital personal assistants (DPAs). A DPA is an intelligent automated system that interacts with the user through a dialogue in natural language, and meanwhile applying third-party services to obtain information and perform various actions. We analyze the benefits of increasing usage of DPAs, such as reduction of transaction costs, enhanced organization efficiency, procompetitive effects, and boosting the e-commerce economy. Besides benefits, however, adopting DPA in life may also contain some risks and downsides, which may reduce the positive welfare effects or even lead to decreasing welfare: biased services, market power on the DPA market and economic dependence on a dominant DPA, potential leveraging of DPA suppliers' market power into neighboring markets, personalized data (ab)use and privacy, media bias and manipulation of public opinion.
The importance of digital platforms and related data-driven business models is ever increasing and poses challenges for the workability of competition in the respective markets (tendencies towards dominant platforms, paying-with-data instead of traditional money, privacy concerns, etc.). Due to such challenges, investigations of such markets are of high interest. One of recent cases is the investigation of Facebook's data collection practices by German competition authorities. Our paper, in contrast to the wide stream of legal studies on this case, aims to analyze whether Facebook's practices regarding data collection could constitute an abuse of market power from an economic perspective, more specifically against the background of modern data economics. In doing so we summarize the state of the advanced theories, including influences from behavioral economics, addressing such markets, and discuss four potential theories of harm.
This paper provides an economic analysis of recent vertical and horizontal mergers in the U.S. industry for audiovisual media content, including the AT&T-Time Warner and the Disney-Fox mergers. Using a theory-driven approach, we examine economic effects of these types of mergers on market competition, focusing on digital media content distribution. In doing so, we address three research questions: (i) Is the current development of analyzing industry with its recent merger activity concerning? (ii) Would vertical or horizontal integration be more preferable for overall welfare and competition in this industry? (iii) What are implications for antitrust policy? We conclude from our analysis that in the already highly horizontally concentrated U.S. market for audiovisual content the process of further vertical integration creates concerns from a competition policy perspective. Moreover, even though horizontal concentration on some of the market stages may be anticompetitive as well, vertical integration is likely to be more harmful. As a consequence, we recommend a stricter approach to vertical merger control in this industry, as well as a more active abuse control against already vertically-integrated media companies.
Computational antitrust is gaining high attention from competition authorities worldwide. In this paper, we examine the promises and downsides of merger simulations as a tool of computational antitrust. In doing this, we first provide an overview of the working mechanisms of the merger simulation tool and then evaluate its implementation in competition policy, including the question of whether more sophisticated technologies would change analysis. We consider perspectives from industrial economics, institutional economics, and political economics. The results of the analysis show that institutions matter to reap considerable prospects of merger simulations as a computational antitrust tool.
This article provides an economic analysis of recent vertical and horizontal mergers in the US industry for audio-visual media content, including the AT&T–Time Warner and the Disney– Fox mergers. Using a theory-driven approach, we examine economic effects of these types of mergers on market competition, focusing on digital media content distribution. In doing so, we address three research questions: (1) Is the current development of the industry with its recent merger activity concerning? (2) Would vertical or horizontal integration be more preferable for overall welfare and competition in this industry? (3) What are implications for antitrust policy? We conclude from our analysis that in the already highly horizontally concentrated US market for audio-visual content the process of further vertical integration creates concerns from a competition policy perspective. Moreover, even though horizontal concentration on some of the market stages may be anticompetitive as well, vertical integration is likely to be more harmful. As a consequence, we recommend a stricter approach to vertical merger control in this industry, as well as a more active abuse control against already vertically integrated media companies. competition policy, antitrust, industrial economics, digitization, media economics, institutional economics, industrial organization, mergers, vertical integration, horizontal integration
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
hi@scite.ai
10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614
Henderson, NV 89052, USA
Copyright © 2024 scite LLC. All rights reserved.
Made with 💙 for researchers
Part of the Research Solutions Family.