Prospects and Limits of Merger Simulations as a Computational Antitrust Tool

Abstract

Computational antitrust is gaining high attention from competition authorities worldwide. In this paper, we examine the promises and downsides of merger simulations as a tool of computational antitrust. In doing this, we first provide an overview of the working mechanisms of the merger simulation tool and then evaluate its implementation in competition policy, including the question of whether more sophisticated technologies would change analysis. We consider perspectives from industrial economics, institutional economics, and political economics. The results of the analysis show that institutions matter to reap considerable prospects of merger simulations as a computational antitrust tool.

Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers: A Retrospective on Retrospectives

“…However, ex-post evaluations of competition authority decisions can have different motivations. In general, these can be divided into the following (Don et al 2008;Davies & Ormosi 2012;Budzinski 2013;Budzinski & Stöhr 2018):…”

In The Light Of Dynamic Competition: Should We Make Merger Remedies More Flexible?

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