Change and Stasis: The Institutionalisation of Developing Country Mitigation in the International Climate Regime

Prys‐Hansen, Miriam; Franz, B

doi:10.1080/09592296.2015.1096702

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…Looking specifically at the climate regime, we provide empirical evidence about the extent to which and the reasons why the introduction of a rigid differential treatment has led to an increased manifestation of two opposing blocs in the negotiations. Several studies have discussed differential treatment as one reason for the stalemate in the climate negotiations (Depledge 2009;Gupta 2010;Prys-Hansen and Franz 2015); however, this paper offers theoretical justification and empirical proof of why this is so. On a general level, we contribute to the broader question of how institutional design and historic path dependencies are linked to stasis (or change) in international negotiations as well as countries' incentives to cooperate and coordinate their activities.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 85%

“…However, from a political science perspective, only a handful of studies have tried to understand how differential treatment influences negotiation dynamics (Castro et al 2014;Okereke and Coventry 2016;Prys-Hansen and Franz 2015), namely the interaction between parties to an international organization or agreement. This article aims to improve our understanding in this field by disentangling the causal mechanisms that link differential treatment and negotiation behavior.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Institutionalization of a Cleavage: How Differential Treatment Affects State Behavior in the Climate Negotiations

Castro

Kammerer

2021

International Studies Quarterly

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Differential treatment is a key norm in multilateral environmental agreements. Its main objective is to increase compliance and reduce the free-rider problem by apportioning the costs and benefits of implementation more equitably across the parties in an agreement. The question of how to differentiate those burdens is inextricably linked to national interests, and while in some instances differential treatment is well designed and facilitates cooperation, in other cases a rigid divide—or cleavage—leads to a stalemate and constant conflict. This article studies the consequences of differential treatment as institutionalized under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Previous research has shown that the separation of UNFCCC parties into two opposing groups has deepened the polarization in the negotiations. We identify two causal mechanisms that may have driven this polarization, namely socialization through material incentives and the formation of group identity. We draw on an original dataset that records (dis)agreements between country pairs, coded from negotiation summaries between 1995 and 2013. Using a relational events model, we show that the division of UNFCCC parties into Annex I (with obligations) and non-Annex I (without obligations) is related primarily to material incentives and less to group identity formation. El trato diferenciado es una norma fundamental en los acuerdos ambientales multilaterales. Su principal objetivo es aumentar el cumplimiento y reducir el problema de los oportunistas distribuyendo los costos y los beneficios de la implementación de forma más equitativa entre las partes de un acuerdo. La cuestión de cómo diferenciar esas cargas está inextricablemente vinculada a los intereses nacionales y mientras que en algunos casos el trato diferenciado está bien diseñado y facilita la cooperación, en otros casos, una división rígida o escisión conduce a un estancamiento o un conflicto constante. En este artículo se estudian las consecuencias del trato diferenciado institucionalizado en la Convención Marco de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Cambio Climático (CMNUCC). Investigaciones anteriores han demostrado que la separación de las partes de la CMNUCC en dos grupos opuestos ha profundizado la polarización en las negociaciones. Identificamos dos mecanismos causales que pueden haber impulsado esta polarización; a saber, la socialización a través de incentivos materiales y la formación de la identidad de grupo. Nos basamos en un conjunto de datos original que registra los (des)acuerdos entre pares de países, codificados a partir de resúmenes de negociación entre 1995 y 2013. Utilizando un modelo de eventos relacionales, demostramos que la división de las partes de la CMNUCC en Anexo I (con obligaciones) y no Anexo I (sin obligaciones) está relacionada principalmente con los incentivos materiales y no tan relacionada con la formación de la identidad de grupo. Le traitement différencié est une norme clé des accords environnementaux multilatéraux. Son principal objectif est d'accroître la conformité et de réduire le problème de bénéficiaire sans contrepartie en répartissant plus équitablement les coûts et les avantages de la mise en œuvre d'un accord entre les parties qui y sont impliquées. La question de savoir comment différencier ces « fardeaux » est inextricablement liée aux intérêts nationaux, et bien que dans certains cas, le traitement différencié soit bien conçu et facilite la coopération, dans d'autres cas, une séparation rigide—ou clivage—conduit à une impasse et à un conflit permanent. Cet article étudie les conséquences du traitement différencié tel qu'il est institutionnalisé dans la Convention-cadre des Nations unies sur les changements climatiques (CCNUCC). Une recherche précédente a monté que la séparation des parties de la CCNUCC en deux groupes opposés avait accru la polarisation des négociations. Nous avons identifié deux mécanismes causaux qui peuvent avoir entraîné cette polarisation: la socialisation par incitations matérielles et la formation d'une identité de groupe. Nous nous appuyons sur un jeu de données original retraçant les (dés)accords entre paires de pays, qui ont été codés à partir des résumés des négociations qui sont intervenues entre 1995 et 2013. Nous utilisons un modèle d’événements relationnels et montrons que la séparation entre parties de la CCNUCC en pays de l'Annexe I (avec obligations) et pays hors Annexe I (sans obligations) est principalement davantage associée à des incitations matérielles qu’à une formation d'identité de groupe.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 85%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Institutionalization of a Cleavage: How Differential Treatment Affects State Behavior in the Climate Negotiations

Castro

Kammerer

2021

International Studies Quarterly

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“…Scholars in international relations (IR) have explored the politics surrounding these provisions too, focusing especially on a few particularly prominent cases. In global environmental politics, for example, the principle of CBDR-RC has been a major focus of inquiry, especially within qualitative studies of the climate and ozone regimes (Biermann 1997;Castro and Kammerer 2021;Ella 2017;McGee and Steffek 2016;Prys-Hansen and Franz 2015;Thompson 2020). But, in IR, relatively few have taken a quantitative approach that looks across regimes to understand these provisions.…”

Section: Measuring Differentiation For Developing Countriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Differentiation in Environmental Treaty Making: Measuring Provisions and How They Reshape the Depth–Participation Dilemma

Farias¹,

Roger²

2023

Global Environmental Politics

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In this article we measure, describe, and demonstrate the importance of differential treatment for developing countries in multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). So far, we argue, quantitative research on differentiation has been minimal due to data constraints and the complex nature of relevant provisions. In response, we offer a way of relieving this constraint, exploiting the fact that MEAs with differentiation typically identify distinct sets of “developing country” parties. After describing the data collection process, we show that differentiation is surprisingly uncommon, appearing in only 6 percent of MEAs, and disproportionately appears in larger, more recent agreements. We then test a key conjecture about differentiation by revisiting the debate on the depth–participation dilemma. We demonstrate, specifically, how it conditions this relationship. When MEAs do not differentiate, greater depth reduces participation; when they do, the relationship is reversed, making it possible to sustain high levels of both. This result helps to reconcile conflicting findings in earlier studies and has important policy implications.

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Common But Differentiated Responsibilities Beyond the Nation State: How Is Differential Treatment Addressed in Transnational Climate Governance Initiatives?

Castro¹

2016

TEL

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Many multilateral environmental agreements have adopted differentiated rules for different countries, based on the recognition of the 'common but differentiated responsibilities' (CBDRs) of states. By establishing two rigid groups of countries with and without emissions reduction obligations, the intergovernmental climate regime represents the most extreme case of such differentiation. The regime has struggled to overcome this rigidity and the resulting political deadlock between developing and developed countries. Transnational climate governance (TCG) initiatives have emerged as an alternative to provide mitigation, adaptation or finance outside the multilateral process. By drawing on synergies between public and private actors, it is hoped that they overcome the paralysis of the intergovernmental process. Yet, they take place in the same world of unequal peers, with different levels of capacity and responsibility for climate change. This article investigates the extent to which such TCG initiatives reflect the CBDR principle. Do different types of initiative -involving different types of actor or with different climate-related goals -address differentiation in distinct ways? Does taking account of CBDRs affect the membership of transnational initiatives? This article explores these questions empirically by analyzing a sample of TCG initiatives in terms of how they include differential treatment of states and non-state members. It concludes that TCG initiatives address differentiation in a pragmatic way. Most frequently, they either offer participants flexibility in how to implement their commitments, or provide support to members from developing countries. Such support is, so far, still insufficient to address the limited involvement of developing country actors.

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Change and Stasis: The Institutionalisation of Developing Country Mitigation in the International Climate Regime

Cited by 3 publications

References 20 publications

The Institutionalization of a Cleavage: How Differential Treatment Affects State Behavior in the Climate Negotiations

The Institutionalization of a Cleavage: How Differential Treatment Affects State Behavior in the Climate Negotiations

Differentiation in Environmental Treaty Making: Measuring Provisions and How They Reshape the Depth–Participation Dilemma

Common But Differentiated Responsibilities Beyond the Nation State: How Is Differential Treatment Addressed in Transnational Climate Governance Initiatives?

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