Chancellor Schröder's approach to political and legislative leadership

Patzelt, Werner J.

doi:10.1080/0964400042000248205

Cited by 24 publications

(9 citation statements)

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“…Inherently consensual issues are either opposition parties, when they hold a majority in the Bundesrat and when they do not. We see that holding a majority in the second chamber does in fact decrease opposition party roll rates by 15 If we run the same regression for the other coalition partners, the SPD and Greens, which are in government only during Wahlper 14, we see a much higher effect of the Bundesrat status change, which is shown by results presented in Table 5.52 These results again suggest an effect for divided government.…”

Section: Hypothesis H6supporting

confidence: 58%

“…These include allocation of funds to Land governments, which is key for the government to buy off votes in the Bundesrat. 48 Some examples are famous. In 1999, on the decision of the German nationality law, the SPD -Green government negotiated a deal with the SPD -FDP government of Rhineland-Palatinate and thereby secured a majority in the Bundesrat.…”

Section: Results Regarding Divided Governmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Moreover, many politicians and scholars in Germany believe that divided control of the bicameral German parliament is causing gridlock reminiscent of the kind found in the US. 14,15 We shall show that divided government has a statistically discernible, yet small, effect on the government's ability to control the agenda and make policy. The effect is small because the government manages to secure the support of the Bundesrat even during divided government, by buying off the votes of Länder delegations to whom it allocates funds in exchange for their support.…”

Section: Divided Governmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Agenda control in the Bundestag, 1980–2002

2006

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We find strong evidence of monopoly legislative agenda control by government parties in the Bundestag. First, the government parties have near-zero roll rates, while the opposition parties are often rolled over half the time. Second, only opposition parties' (and not government parties') roll rates increase with the distances of each party from the floor median. Third, almost all policy moves are towards the government coalition (the only exceptions occur during periods of divided government). Fourth, roll rates for government parties skyrocket when they fall into the opposition and roll rates for opposition parties plummet when they enter government, while policy movements go from being nearly 100 per cent rightward when there is a rightist government to 100 per cent leftward under a leftist government. INTRODUCTIONGoverning coalitions in parliamentary democracies are famous for their voting cohesion. Individual MPs rarely dissent from their party's position, coalition partners rarely disagree publicly, and the government's programme thus proceeds through the assembly on the strength of the coalition's numerical superiority -simply outvoting the opposition at every turn.Iron discipline, however, is not a natural phenomenon. The component parties in multiparty coalitions do not agree on all possible issues; they merely agree on all issues actually considered in plenary sessions of the assembly.1 Thus, the high levels of coalition discipline observed in roll call votes are as much a function of governmental agenda control -specifically, the ability of the coalition to prevent bills that would split its members apart from being voted on the floor -as they are of the carrots and sticks that governing parties use to whip their members into line. 2In some polities, such as France's Fifth Republic, 3 the government's ability to control the legislative agenda has clear institutional sources. In this article, we explore agenda setting in Germany, a case in which the government's institutional control of the agenda might be questioned -given the tradition of seeking broad consensus in the Council of Elders (the formal agenda-setting institution in the Bundestag) and the frequency with which the government does not command a majority in the second chamber (the Bundesrat). We argue that the Council of Elders seeks -and is expected by the opposition to seek -only a procedural and not a substantive consensus; that the government is relatively successful at patching together support in the Bundesrat; and thus, that the most likely impediments to governmental agenda

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Section: Hypothesis H6supporting

confidence: 58%

Section: Results Regarding Divided Governmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Divided Governmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Agenda control in the Bundestag, 1980–2002

2006

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“…55 Even though the vote of confidence procedure has been used only once as an agenda setting instrument, 56 it may have important anticipatory effects, and there is qualitative evidence that Chancellor Schröder used the threat to resign repeatedly in order to induce discipline from the governing parties. 57 Finally there is the procedure for legislative emergency (Gesetzgebungsnotstand, Art. 81 GG), which has never been used and does not exert any discernible effects based on anticipation.…”

Section: Agenda Setting Instruments In the Bundestagmentioning

confidence: 99%

Agenda setting in the German Bundestag: A weak government in a consensus democracy

Sieberer

2006

German Politics

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“…Instead, the most appropriate explanation for the significantly higher success rates of governing coalitions in the Länder lies in the fact that most bills not only need to be approved by the Bundestag, but also by the Bundesrat, which is the federal representation of the Länder. It extends party politics by the federal conflict dimension between the Bund and the Länder and the leads to the possibility of a divided government (Rudzio 2003, Patzelt 2004. This complicates the legislative process and explains why the success rates of centralized legislatures at both levels are so different under similar conditions (election system, composition of coalitions and party systems).…”

Section: Explaining the Results In The German Casesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Legislative organization and executive success rate at the subnational level: a comparison of Brazil and Germany, 1990-2010

Weber¹,

Praça²

2014

RIEL

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How does parliamentary organization affect the legislative success rate of the executive in presidential and parliamentary systems at the subnational level? Why are some governors much more successful than others even though they serve under the same basic constitutional designs? This essay explores these questions with a comparison of Brazilian and German states from 1990 to 2010. Our main findings are that governors' success rates in both Brazil and Germany seem not to be associated with centralization of legislative institutions. This means that coalition management and party politics may play a larger role than expected by the literature. Other factors, such as "minor" and neglected legislative arrangements can compound the governors' strength and allow them to reach Westminster levels of legislative success.

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Chancellor Schröder's approach to political and legislative leadership

Cited by 24 publications

References 0 publications

Agenda control in the Bundestag, 1980–2002

Agenda control in the Bundestag, 1980–2002

Agenda setting in the German Bundestag: A weak government in a consensus democracy

Legislative organization and executive success rate at the subnational level: a comparison of Brazil and Germany, 1990-2010

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