Agenda setting in the German Bundestag: A weak government in a consensus democracy

Sieberer, Ulrich

doi:10.1080/09644000500534972

Cited by 28 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Similar to the German Bundestag (cf. Sieberer, 2006a), the agenda is set by all parties consensually and no effective negative agenda control is possible. In all state parliaments signal voting is the standard operating procedure.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

How effects on party unity vary across votes

Stecker

2013

Party Politics

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Our current knowledge of the causes of party unity rests heavily on the analysis of average unity scores of party groups from different countries. This study design invites two related problems: By aggregating unity scores we miss valuable variance at the level of disaggregated votes, and by comparing these aggregate scores across time and countries we might confound institutional effects with an unobserved case-specific selection bias of roll-call votes. In taking advantage of the laboratory-like conditions of the 16 sub-national parliaments of Germany and shifting the level of analysis to party unity in every single vote this article addresses both problems. Analysing 8607 unity scores, it is shown that the voting context is an important moderator of institutional effects on party unity. Specifically, it is shown that government status boosts party unity particularly within legislative important votes. Furthermore, the unity-boosting effect of slim majorities is only present for government parties and particularly strong when legislative consequential decisions are taken. Beyond that I also show that roll-call vote request, increasing ideological distances and norms of party loyalty increase party unity.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

How effects on party unity vary across votes

Stecker

2013

Party Politics

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“…First, such reforms are less likely in the presence of extra-parliamentary veto points (e.g., a second chamber, a powerful head of state, or a constitutional court) because these institutions potentially provide opposition parties with further means to block the majority's agenda. Thus, any benefits drawn from curbing minority rights in parliament could be reversed in other arenas (Sieberer 2006;Sieberer & Müller 2015). 9 Second, a suppression of minority rights becomes less likely if government parties cannot muster the necessary majority to change the rules without the consent of opposition parties, which depends on the combination of the government's seat share and majority requirement for rule changes.…”

Section: How Policy Conflict 'Goes Institutional': Theory and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

‘Going institutional’ to overcome obstruction: Explaining the suppression of minority rights in Western European parliaments, 1945−2010

Sieberer

Dutkowski

Meißner

et al. 2020

European J Political Res

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When and why do parliamentary majorities in Europe suppress parliamentary minority rights? This article argues that such reforms are driven by substantive policy conflict in interaction with existing minority rights. Government parties curb minority rights if they fear minority obstruction due to increased policy conflict and a minority-friendly institutional status quo. Empirical support is found for this claim using comparative data on all reforms in 13 Western European parliaments since 1945. A curbing of minority rights is significantly more likely under conditions of heightened policy conflict and these effects are stronger the more the institutional status quo favours opposition parties. Contrary to frequent claims of consensual rule changes from single-country studies in Europe, these findings demonstrate the importance of competitive strategies in explaining institutional reform in European parliaments. The conditional impact of the status quo provides interesting theoretical links to historical institutionalist arguments on path dependence.

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“…For example, the consequences of changing standing orders are limited when basic parliamentary rules are contained in the constitution. Similarly, the benefits the majority can draw from changing the rules of the parliamentary game are reduced when other veto players such as heads of state and second chambers can negate outcomes of the parliamentary process (Sieberer 2006). Third, exogenous institutions can provide actors with incentives and disincentives to pursue specific rule changes.…”

Section: Explaining Changes In Parliamentary Rulesmentioning

confidence: 99%