Chain Innovation Mechanism of the Manufacturing Industry in the Yangtze River Delta of China Based on Evolutionary Game

Abstract

It is of great theoretical and practical significance to achieve high-quality development that promotes the transformation of digestion, absorption, and re-innovation to an independent innovation model, actively participating in the restructuring of the industrial chain, and enhancing the status of the Yangtze River Delta in the global innovation chain. This study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of collaborative innovation led by the government, participated by upstream enterprises and downstream enterprises. Moreover, this article analyzes the strategic choices of the tripartite entities in the process of collaborative innovation, and the simulation analyzes the influencing factors of the government, upstream enterprises, and downstream enterprises’ collaborative innovation strategy selection. The results indicate that the government, upstream enterprises, and downstream enterprises have different degrees of influence on each other’s willingness to participate. In addition, the analysis proves that government policy support and financial support have different impacts on upstream enterprises and downstream enterprises.

Evolutionary Game and Simulation of Collaborative Green Innovation in Supply Chain under Digital Enablement

“…The second type of research focuses on the role of the government in collaborative green innovation. Yu et al [43] discussed the role of government policies in promoting collaborative green innovation in a regional supply chain by constructing a tripartite collaborative innovation evolutionary game between the government and upstream and downstream enterprises.…”

“…In addition, collaborative green innovation in the supply chain is affected by many factors [43]. Among them, government subsidies [44], collaborative innovation benefits and costs [45], benefit distribution mechanisms [46], reward and punishment mechanisms [47], and policy support are considered the main factors affecting the game strategy of collaborative innovation in the supply chain [48].…”

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Carbon Emission Reduction between Government and Enterprises under Carbon Quota Trading Policy

“…The evolutionary game is from the perspective of biological evolution theory [ 56 ], through continuous learning and evolution among individuals [ 57 ], and finally reaches a stable state and forms an evolutionarily stable strategy [ 58 , 59 , 60 ]. Therefore, based on the multi-agent evolution mechanism of carbon trading, this paper sets up the enterprise–government two-party evolutionary game model and the enterprise–enterprise–government three-party evolutionary game model to explore the multi-agent game equilibrium of carbon trading behavior [ 61 ].…”

The Impact of the Digital Economy on the High-Quality Development of Xi’an’s Manufacturing Industry

“…Xi'an equipment manufacturing industry needs to form its core competitiveness. After clarifying the strategic goals, enterprises need the corresponding core competitiveness to support them [3][4][5]. The transformation in Xi'an can not only alleviate the pressure of the declining domestic demographic dividend and the tightening situation of traditional foreign trade but also eliminate many intermediate links of traditional foreign trade and reduce the threshold of engaging in cross-border trade threshold, while saving transaction costs and shortening the operation cycle, thus seeking a new profit growth point [6][7][8].…”