Cell Types as Natural Kinds

Slater, Matthew H.

doi:10.1007/s13752-012-0084-9

Cited by 17 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 29 publications

(11 reference statements)

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“…See Boyd for the original HPC view; Boyd , Griffiths , and Wilson for the original deployments to species; Griffiths , Kornblith , Rieppel , Slater , Wilson , and Wilson et al. for extensions to other kinds; and Ereshefsky and Matthen , Ereshefsky and Reydon , Magnus , and Slater (, ) for ongoing critical discussions.…”

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confidence: 99%

Kinship Past, Kinship Present: Bio-Essentialism in the Study of Kinship

Wilson

2016

American Anthropologist

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In this article, I reconsider bio-essentialism in the study of kinship, centering on David Schneider's influential critique that concluded that kinship was "a non-subject" (1972:51). Schneider's critique is often taken to have shown the limitations of and problems with past views of kinship based on biology, genealogy, and reproduction, a critique that subsequently led those reworking kinship as relatedness in the new kinship studies to view their enterprise as divorced from such bio-essentialist studies. Beginning with an alternative narrative connecting kinship past and present and concluding by introducing a novel way of thinking about kinship, I have three constituent aims in this research article: (1) to reconceptualize the relationship between kinship past and kinship present; (2) to reevaluate Schneider's critique of bio-essentialism and what this implies for the contemporary study of kinship; and (3) subsequently to redirect theoretical discussion of what kinship is. This concluding discussion introduces a general view, the homeostatic property cluster (HPC) view of kinds, into anthropology, providing a theoretical framework that facilitates realization of the often-touted desideratum of the integration of biological and social features of kinship.[bio-essentialism, kinship studies, homeostatic property cluster kinds, Schneider, genealogy] ABSTRAIT Cet article reconsidère le bio-essentialisme dans l'étude de la parenté, en mettant l'accent sur la critique influente de David Schneider soutenant que la parenté est un «non-sujet» (1972:51). La critique de Schneider est souvent considérée comme ayant démontré les limites des conceptions de la parenté fondées sur la biologie, la généalogie et la reproduction. Dans les nouvellesétudes de la parenté, cette critique a conduit ceux qui travaillent sur la parenté conç ue comme apparentementà présenter leur entreprise commeétant opposée auxétudes bio-essentialistes. Commenç ant avec un récit reliant parenté passée et présente et offrant une nouvelle faç on de penser la parenté, cet article a trois objectifs cardinaux: (1) redéfinir la relation entre la parenté passée et la parenté présente, (2) réévaluer la critique par Schneider du bio-essentialisme et ce qu'il implique pour l'étude contemporaine de la parenté, et (3) enfin réorienter la discussion théorique de ce qu'est la parenté. Cette discussion se termine par l'introduction en anthropologie d'un schème conceptuel -le groupement de propriétés homéostatiques (GPH) vue de catégories naturelles -fournissant un cadre théorique pour l'intégration tant recherchée des car- RESUMEN Este artículo reconsidera el esencialismo biológico (bio-esencialismo) en el estudio del parentesco, centrándose en la influyente crítica de David Schneider. A menudo se considera que la crítica de Schneider ha demostrado los problemas y las limitaciones de teorías del parentesco anteriores, basadas en la biología, la genealogía y la reproducción. Su crítica contribuyó a que aquellos que trabajaban el parentesco como afinidad ("...

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confidence: 99%

Kinship Past, Kinship Present: Bio-Essentialism in the Study of Kinship

Wilson

2016

American Anthropologist

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“…For some, they are old essences in a new dress (this is how Häggqvist 2005 seems to read HPC Theory). But the most detailed and profound revision of HPC in this respect is due to Matthew Slater (2013Slater ( , 2015. He has recently argued, against Boyd and his followers, that appealing to homeostatic mechanisms in a cluster theory of kinds is neither sufficient nor necessary to ground our epistemic practices with natural kinds, even in so paradigmatic a case as that of species as kinds.…”

Section: Concerns About Hpc Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

“Dealing with the changeable and blurry edges of living things: a modified version of property-cluster kinds”

Ruiz

Umerez

2018

Euro Jnl Phil Sci

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Despite many attempts to achieve an adequate definition of living systems by means of a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, the opinion that such an enterprise is inexorably destined to fail is increasingly gaining support. However, we believe options do not just come down to either having faith in a future success or endorsing skepticism. In this paper, we aim to redirect the discussion of the problem by shifting the focus of attention from strict definitions (in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions) towards a philosophical framework that allows conceiving of living systems as a natural kind, but whereby natural kinds are not to be defined by fixed necessary and sufficient conditions. We argue for a property-cluster kind approach according to which living systems constitute a natural kind with vague boundaries, capable of changing, and whose members do not need to instantiate every property. We draw from Boyd's homeostatic property-cluster theory and introduce two modifications, one regarding homeostatic mechanisms and another related to the scientific role of kinds. Thus, our view overcomes some difficulties of Boyd's theory and we are able to account for the natural kindhood of living things. We also emphasize the most appealing features of our approach for specific research fields and address three objections to this sort of approach.

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“…Philosophical understandings of the concept of natural kinds and debates about the usefulness of the very concept for understanding scientific classification and conceptual change are still evolving as philosophers of science expand the focus of their inquiry to a number of diverse and interdisciplinary areas of science (see e.g., Bolker, 2013;Brigandt, 2003Brigandt, , 2010Brigandt, , 2012Bursten, 2016;Godman, 2013;Kendig, 2016aKendig, , 2016bLudwig, 2017;Ludwig, 2018;Muszynski & Malaterre, 2020;Ruphy, 2010;Slater, 2015;Slater, 2013;Tabb, 2019;Tsou, 2013;Zachar, 2000). Natural kinds realists have expressed optimism that just so long as the aims of classification in a given scientific domain are broadly epistemic, natural kinds in some form (e.g., HPC, MPC) will be in the offing (e.g., Boyd, 2019;Kendler et al, 2011;Khalidi, 2013), and there may be different epistemically admirable ways of conceptually carving up the world that cross-cut each other (e.g., Khalidi, 2013).…”

Section: Constructed Kindsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Classification, kinds, taxonomic stability and conceptual change

Mattu

Sullivan

2021

Aggression and Violent Behavior

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Scientists represent their world, grouping and organizing phenomena into classes by means of concepts. Philosophers of science have historically been interested in the nature of these concepts, the criteria that inform their application and the nature of the kinds that the concepts individuate. They also have sought to understand whether and how different systems of classification are related and more recently, how investigative practices shape conceptual development and change. Our aim in this paper is to provide a critical overview of some of the key developments in this philosophical literature and identify some interesting issues it raises about the prospects of the so-called "special sciences", including psychiatry, psychology, and the mind-brain sciences more generally, to discover natural kinds. 2. Principles of classification: a brief historical overview 2.1. Conventionalism Human beings impose conceptual order on their world. In the most basic terms, we are born into a world of language users; learning the meanings of words requires the abilities to detect objects having certain properties in the world, to recognize similarities and differences among those objects with respect to those properties and to understand that things that others identify using the same name share certain properties in common. We learn these basic rules of classification and assign things that share properties in common to groups having unique names. Common examples of groups include stars, mammals, trees, beliefs and feelings. We learn that stars have the basic properties of being luminous and visible in the night sky and that beliefs are things that humans and some non-human animals have that can be assigned a truth value. Sometimes we place unlike things into the same group-we misclassify

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Cell Types as Natural Kinds

Cited by 17 publications

References 29 publications

Kinship Past, Kinship Present: Bio-Essentialism in the Study of Kinship

Kinship Past, Kinship Present: Bio-Essentialism in the Study of Kinship

“Dealing with the changeable and blurry edges of living things: a modified version of property-cluster kinds”

Classification, kinds, taxonomic stability and conceptual change

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