Carbon emission reduction behavior strategies in the shipping industry under government regulation: A tripartite evolutionary game analysis

Meng, Lingpeng; Liu, Kemeng; He, Junliang; Han, Chuanfeng; Liu, Pihui

doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2022.134556

Cited by 56 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 40 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Zhou et al [32] studied the relationship between government intervention and low-carbon innovation technology by constructing a three-way evolutionary model. Meng et al [33] built a three-way evolutionary model between the government and the shipping industry, analyzing the impact of government regulation on energy-saving and emission reduction strategies in the shipping industry. Yuan et al [34] analyzed the relationship between the government and prefabricated housing construction by constructing a three-way evolutionary model, proposing a mechanism for promoting prefabricated housing construction.…”

Section: The Application Of Evolutionary Game Theory In the Steel Ind...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To simplify the analysis and incorporate currency unit exchange rates, the initial value of the Chinese carbon price (CP) is set to 0.083. The values for the government's proactive response to the CBAM political gains (Vg) and high-carbon implicit losses (F) are abstract and determined through consultation with government experts and literature research [33,60]. The government's tax refund subsidies for enterprises, E i (i = 1, 2), are set based on the research data from Wang [61] and Chang et al [62].…”

Section: Parameter Sources and Settingsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Impacts of Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism on the Development of Chinese Steel Enterprises and Government Management Decisions: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis

Tian,

Zheng,

Liu

et al. 2024

Sustainability

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Upon the implementation of the European Union Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), substantial challenges are anticipated to impact the international trade of Chinese steel products. To safeguard the competitiveness of Chinese steel products on the global stage, this paper establishes a tripartite evolutionary game model, involving large steel enterprises, small- and medium-sized steel enterprises, and the government. The model integrates collaborative emission reduction and free-riding benefits among enterprises, along with the government’s dynamic subsidies and penalties. First, we calculate the replicator dynamic equations and conduct stability analysis to obtain the evolutionary trends and system equilibrium points in different phases of the CBAM. Then, we validate the evolutionary theoretical analysis of the model through example simulation analysis. Finally, we explore the impact of different parameters on the agents through a sensitivity analysis of parameters. The findings indicate that (1) large enterprises demonstrate greater sensitivity to CBAM, making their production structures more susceptible to changes in CBAM policies; (2) small- and medium-sized enterprises are more prone to free-riding behavior influence; (3) government intervention should be kept within appropriate boundaries, as excessive intervention may lead to strategic oscillation, with passive management being chosen by the government during the strengthening phase of CBAM; (4) elevating the price in the Chinese carbon market would slow down the structural changes in the production of Chinese steel enterprises, serving as an effective measure to counteract the impacts of CBAM. This paper provides theoretical support for how steel enterprises and the government can respond to CBAM, aiding stakeholders in selecting optimal strategies during different implementation stages and mitigating the impacts of the CBAM to the maximum extent possible.

show abstract

Section: The Application Of Evolutionary Game Theory In the Steel Ind...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Parameter Sources and Settingsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Impacts of Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism on the Development of Chinese Steel Enterprises and Government Management Decisions: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis

Tian,

Zheng,

Liu

et al. 2024

Sustainability

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…They argued that government subsidies and input-output ratios were critical for enterprises to collaborate on air-pollution-control investments. Meng et al [27] constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government, port enterprises, and shipping enterprises, and analyzed the evolution of the carbon-emission-reduction strategy. They found that an increase in government subsidies for shipping enterprises would lead to a decrease in the additional costs of positive emission reduction.…”

Section: Evolutionary Game On Carbon-emission Reduction Between Gover...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Governments’ and Enterprises’ Carbon-Emission Reduction

Li,

Gao,

2024

Sustainability

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

With the increasingly serious problem of global climate change, many countries are positively promoting carbon-emission-reduction actions. In order to deeply explore the interaction between enterprises’ carbon-emission reduction and governments’ regulation, this paper builds evolutionary game models between governments and enterprises under the reward-and-punishment mechanism. The peer-incentive mechanism is introduced to incentivize enterprises to reduce carbon emissions and coordinate governments and enterprises. The evolutionary-stability strategies are obtained by solving the evolutionary game models. The stability of equilibrium points under different situations is theoretically and numerically studied. The results show that the existence of peer incentives makes enterprises more inclined to positively reduce carbon emissions and governments more inclined to positively regulate. A sufficiently large peer fund can always encourage enterprises to choose positive carbon-reduction emission strategies, while governments choose positive regulation strategies. Not only the increasing rewards and fines but also lowering regulatory costs will promote carbon-emission-reduction behaviors of enterprises. Peer incentives are more effective in promoting positive emission reduction of enterprises compared with rewards and punishments. This study can provide important guidance for governments to formulate regulatory strategies and for enterprises to formulate emission-reduction strategies.

show abstract

“…For convenience of description, this case is named Case 1. Based on the behavior patterns of various parties during the low-carbon transformation process, this article assigns values to parameters with reference to the relevant parameter settings in carbon reduction-related research [33][34][35]. Suppose that the government's supervision cost C 1 = 40, the enterprise's low−carbon transformation cost C 2 = 70, the verification cost of the verification organization C 3 = 20, the comprehensive income brought by the enterprise s low-carbon transformation strategy V 1 = 120, the income of maintaining the status quo V 2 = 110, the low-carbon subsidy given by the government to the enterprise S = 30, the verification remuneration given by the government to the verification organization W = 40, and the penalty charged by the government when the enterprise maintains the status quo F 1 = 20.…”

Section: Tripartite Negative Strategiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Can Carbon Trading Promote Low-Carbon Transformation of High Energy Consumption Enterprises?—The Case of China

Chen

Yang

et al. 2023

Energies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper explores the effect of carbon trading on low-carbon transformation of high energy consumption enterprises in China. Based on the mechanism of interaction and restriction among high energy consumption enterprises, carbon verification agencies and the government, a tripartite evolutionary game model is constructed. The three-dimensional dynamic system is built to analyze the behavior patterns of the three parties. The evolution path of the tripartite game is visualized, and the low-carbon transformation states of high energy consumption enterprises in different situations are described. The results show that the high energy consumption enterprises, verification organization and the government cannot reach the optimal game equilibrium (low-carbon transformation, verification and supervision) temporarily when seeking their own interests. The corresponding measures should be taken with different situations of the tripartite game. No matter what strategy the government chooses, the low-carbon transformation could be promoted by carbon trading through carbon verification mechanism.

show abstract

Carbon emission reduction behavior strategies in the shipping industry under government regulation: A tripartite evolutionary game analysis

Cited by 56 publications

References 40 publications

Impacts of Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism on the Development of Chinese Steel Enterprises and Government Management Decisions: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis

Impacts of Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism on the Development of Chinese Steel Enterprises and Government Management Decisions: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Governments’ and Enterprises’ Carbon-Emission Reduction

Can Carbon Trading Promote Low-Carbon Transformation of High Energy Consumption Enterprises?—The Case of China

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About