2023
DOI: 10.3390/en16083438
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Can Carbon Trading Promote Low-Carbon Transformation of High Energy Consumption Enterprises?—The Case of China

Abstract: This paper explores the effect of carbon trading on low-carbon transformation of high energy consumption enterprises in China. Based on the mechanism of interaction and restriction among high energy consumption enterprises, carbon verification agencies and the government, a tripartite evolutionary game model is constructed. The three-dimensional dynamic system is built to analyze the behavior patterns of the three parties. The evolution path of the tripartite game is visualized, and the low-carbon transformati… Show more

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Cited by 4 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…Currently, in the process of energy saving and emission reduction policies research, most of the studies focus on the analysis of the game behavior between the government and enterprises. Some studies also focus on establishing a three-party evolutionary game among enterprises, government, and verification agencies to examine the interactions and constraint mechanisms among these players [ 29 , 30 ]. Few studies have included the public as players in the game model and considered a comprehensive balance of interests in collaborative governance among governing subjects.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Currently, in the process of energy saving and emission reduction policies research, most of the studies focus on the analysis of the game behavior between the government and enterprises. Some studies also focus on establishing a three-party evolutionary game among enterprises, government, and verification agencies to examine the interactions and constraint mechanisms among these players [ 29 , 30 ]. Few studies have included the public as players in the game model and considered a comprehensive balance of interests in collaborative governance among governing subjects.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The ability of the verification agency to accurately verify a company's carbon emissions and report them truthfully to relevant authorities determines the success of low-carbon transformation efforts (Li Y. et al, 2023). Enterprises and verification agencies might conspire to pursue their benefits, resulting in obstacles to low-carbon transformation initiatives (Chen et al, 2023). Additionally, government oversight may be lacking, which can directly contribute to a decrease in intrinsic motivation for transitioning to low-carbon practices (Zhang et al, 2023).…”
Section: Basic Assumptionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For example, the usage of different types of coal might result in a range of 15% uncertainty in CO 2 emission calculations in China [12]. China's Ministry of Ecology and Environment has published a series of policies to support the application of EFA measurements; however, there are still plenty of reports about the problems faced by industrial companies regarding their carbon emissions accounting due to the imperfections of current methods or even data falsification [13,14]. Therefore, it remains a challenge to explore a new carbon emission accounting method that can meet the urgent demands of upcoming industrial sectors, such as the cement industry, in a more cost-effective, reliable, and scalable way.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%