Can CDM monitoring requirements be reduced while maintaining environmental integrity?

Warnecke, Carsten

doi:10.1080/14693062.2014.875285

Cited by 14 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…This frequency is often borrowed from existing national or international standards. The impact of calibration requirements on the actual uncertainty may be significant but is difficult to quantify across sectors and schemes 9 .…”

Section: Nature Climate Change Doi: 101038/nclimate2544mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Although some CDM tools and methodologies are already awarding fewer credits in proportion to reported uncertainty, this is not systematic. Many CDM methodologies provide an implicit incentive to reduce uncertainty by using conservative default values for some parameters or variables 9 . Yet these incentives remain limited in the CDM for three reasons 12 .…”

Section: Conservativeness: Gap Between Principle and Practicementioning

confidence: 99%

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Monitoring, reporting and verifying emissions in the climate economy

et al. 2015

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Section: Nature Climate Change Doi: 101038/nclimate2544mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Conservativeness: Gap Between Principle and Practicementioning

confidence: 99%

Monitoring, reporting and verifying emissions in the climate economy

et al. 2015

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“…For example, while the CDM could theoretically increase ambition and provide “net mitigation” when crediting periods are shorter than the project lifetime, additionality issues put this possibility into question (Erickson, Lazarus, & Spalding‐Fecher, ). Discounting carbon credits and using baselines below business‐as‐usual were put forward as potential ways to provide “net mitigation” (Warnecke, ).…”

Section: Carbon Markets and Regulatory Framework Post‐parismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Generally, there is a trade‐off between the stringency and the cost of monitoring, which if not addressed properly may become a major barrier for the implementation of mitigation projects in some sectors, particularly in the context of currently low international carbon prices (Shishlov & Bellassen, ). For example, monitoring rules under the CDM are often more stringent than those under the EU ETS, which could potentially put an unreasonable burden on project developers (Warnecke, ).…”

Section: Carbon Markets and Regulatory Framework Post‐parismentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolution of international carbon markets: lessons for the Paris Agreement

Michaelowa

Shishlov

Brescia

2019

WIREs Climate Change

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The Paris Agreement will greatly benefit from the past experience with international market mechanisms for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reductions and related regulatory systems, which have gone through four periods with specific challenges. The first period 1997–2004 operationalized the mechanisms defined in the Kyoto Protocol, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI). Pilot activities in different sectors were undertaken by the public sector, and the first baseline and monitoring methodologies officially approved. Between 2005 and 2011, the carbon markets expanded massively. The EU emission trading scheme (EU ETS) was linked to the Kyoto mechanisms, creating demand for carbon credits from the private sector. During this “gold rush” period criticism emerged with regarding the uneven geographical distribution of projects, as well as environmental integrity problems related to baselines and additionality. The next period saw a collapse in carbon prices between 2012 and 2014, limiting the development of new projects. The quantitative limits on the use of offsets in the EU ETS were reached and the failure to agree on a new international regime resulted in a drying up of demand from governments. The 2015–2018 period is characterized by a gradual stabilization of the international climate regime. The Paris Agreement adopted in 2015 increases complexity through global participation in mitigation. Future carbon markets will therefore face both old challenges—supply–demand balance, environmental integrity, transaction costs—and new ones—interactions with other policies and national targets, and sectoral/policy baselines and additionality checks preventing hot air proliferation. This article is categorized under: The Carbon Economy and Climate Mitigation > Policies, Instruments, Lifestyles, Behavior

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“…Nordhaus & Boyer, 1999;Weyant & Hill, 1999) and environmental impacts (e.g. Barrett, 1998), analysis of the performance of the CDM (Castro & Michaelowa, 2008;Haya, 2009;Schneider, 2009;Wara & Victor, 2008) and JI (Kollmuss, Schneider, & Zhezherin, 2015;Shishlov, Bellassen, & Leguet, 2012;Zhenchuk, 2012), the use of Kyoto units under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS, Stephan, Bellassen, & Alberola, 2014), carbon accounting in the CDM (Shishlov & Bellassen, 2015;Warnecke, 2014) and its contribution to sustainable development (Boyd et al, 2009;Gupta, van Beukering, van Asselt, van der Gaast, & de Jong, 2008;Haya & Parekh, 2011;Schneider, 2007), to name only a few.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

Compliance of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol in the first commitment period

2016

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International audienceThis article provides an ex post analysis of the compliance of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol during the first commitment period (2008-2012) based on the final data for national GHG emissions and exchanges in carbon units that became available at the end of 2015. On the domestic level, among the 36 countries that fully participated in the Kyoto Protocol, only nine countries emitted higher levels of GHGs than committed and therefore had to resort to flexibility mechanisms. On the international level - i.e. after the use of flexibility mechanisms - all Annex B Parties are in compliance. Countries implemented different compliance strategies: purchasing carbon units abroad, stimulating the domestic use of carbon credits by the private sector and incentivizing domestic emission reductions through climate policies.Overall, the countries party to the Protocol surpassed their aggregate commitment by an average 2.4 GtCO(2)e yr(-1). Of the possible explanations for this overachievement, hot-air' was estimated at 2.2 GtCO(2)e yr(-1), while accounting rules for land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) further removed 0.4 GtCO(2)e yr(-1) from the net result excluding LULUCF. The hypothetical participation of the US and Canada would have reduced this overachievement by a net 1 GtCO(2)e yr(-1). None of these factors - some of which may be deemed illegitimate - would therefore on its own have led to global non-compliance, even without use of the 0.3 GtCO(2)e of annual emissions reductions generated by the Clean Development Mechanism. The impact of domestic policies and carbon leakage' - neither of which is quantitatively assessed here - should not be neglected either.Policy relevanceGiven the ongoing evolution of the international climate regime and the adoption of the Paris Agreement in December 2015, we believe that there is a need to evaluate the results of the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. To our knowledge there has been no overarching quantitative ex post assessment of the Kyoto Protocol based on the final emissions data for 2008-2012, which became available in late 2015. This article attempts to fill this gap, focusing on the domestic and international compliance of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol in the first commitment period

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Can CDM monitoring requirements be reduced while maintaining environmental integrity?

Cited by 14 publications

References 5 publications

Monitoring, reporting and verifying emissions in the climate economy

Monitoring, reporting and verifying emissions in the climate economy

Evolution of international carbon markets: lessons for the Paris Agreement

Compliance of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol in the first commitment period

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