Compliance of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol in the first commitment period

Abstract

International audienceThis article provides an ex post analysis of the compliance of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol during the first commitment period (2008-2012) based on the final data for national GHG emissions and exchanges in carbon units that became available at the end of 2015. On the domestic level, among the 36 countries that fully participated in the Kyoto Protocol, only nine countries emitted higher levels of GHGs than committed and therefore had to resort to flexibility mechanisms. On the international level - i.e. after the use of flexibility mechanisms - all Annex B Parties are in compliance. Countries implemented different compliance strategies: purchasing carbon units abroad, stimulating the domestic use of carbon credits by the private sector and incentivizing domestic emission reductions through climate policies.Overall, the countries party to the Protocol surpassed their aggregate commitment by an average 2.4 GtCO(2)e yr(-1). Of the possible explanations for this overachievement, hot-air' was estimated at 2.2 GtCO(2)e yr(-1), while accounting rules for land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) further removed 0.4 GtCO(2)e yr(-1) from the net result excluding LULUCF. The hypothetical participation of the US and Canada would have reduced this overachievement by a net 1 GtCO(2)e yr(-1). None of these factors - some of which may be deemed illegitimate - would therefore on its own have led to global non-compliance, even without use of the 0.3 GtCO(2)e of annual emissions reductions generated by the Clean Development Mechanism. The impact of domestic policies and carbon leakage' - neither of which is quantitatively assessed here - should not be neglected either.Policy relevanceGiven the ongoing evolution of the international climate regime and the adoption of the Paris Agreement in December 2015, we believe that there is a need to evaluate the results of the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. To our knowledge there has been no overarching quantitative ex post assessment of the Kyoto Protocol based on the final emissions data for 2008-2012, which became available in late 2015. This article attempts to fill this gap, focusing on the domestic and international compliance of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol in the first commitment period

Evolution of international carbon markets: lessons for the Paris Agreement

“…Another important source of demand for carbon credits came from governments of countries—most notably Japan—that required them for compliance under the KP. Indeed, the analysis of the final data for national GHG emissions and exchanges in carbon units during the first KP Commitment Period demonstrated that overall, the Annex B parties to the KP surpassed their aggregate commitment and that all individual countries were in compliance, with 9 of 36 countries—Austria, Denmark, Iceland, Japan, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, Norway, Spain and Switzerland—achieving it only thanks to the use of flexibility mechanisms (Shishlov et al, ). This source of demand was estimated to be around 300 million tCO 2 e between 2008 and 2015 (Bellassen et al, ).…”

The Wicked Problem of Climate Change: A New Approach Based on Social Mess and Fragmentation

“…Despite the positive achievements reached globally during the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol [64], overall the KP has been found to be more symbolic than substantive in delivering conditions for countries and industries alike and does not address the considerable variation in the emissions already produced by countries and various industrial sectors [48,65,66]. This shortfall further complicates the efforts to generate an appropriate collaborative environmental response [30,67,68].…”

Three Models of Global Climate Governance: From Kyoto to Paris and Beyond

“…While Kyoto was 'legally binding' and did include a novel compliance mechanism, the threat of enforcement was not thought to be credible. While many states may meet their targets (and most did), many believed this would largely be due to factors external to the agreement, not the risk of being punished (Rosen, 2015;Shishlov et al, 2016). Ultimately, little stood in the way when a country, like Canada, failed to meet its obligations and simply exited the treaty.…”