Calling in “Sick”: COVID-19, Opportunism, Pretext, and Subnational Autocratization

Abstract

As governments sought to manage the coronavirus pandemic, many pursed temporary increases in centralized authority, a general tactic of crisis management. However, in some countries, public health was not the only motive for centralization. The COVID-19 response coincided with broader worldwide trends toward autocratization. Some of these efforts happened while the world was preoccupied with responding to the pandemic without concretely referencing coronavirus; however, in other cases, public-health rationales are clearly and explicitly invoked as a pretext for actions that instead aid the consolidation of regime authority. This has been especially pernicious in subnational politics, where efforts have been made to undermine the ability of opposition parties to fairly contest local and regional politics. This article examines four cases in which political actors either opportunistically used distraction from the COVID-19 pandemic or explicitly invoked public health while seeking to undermine long-term political contestation in their jurisdictions: Hong Kong, Hungary, Uganda, and the United States. We characterize the use of pandemic response as pretext or opportunity for undermining opposition parties, recentralizing political authority in dominant actors, and inhibiting the fair contestation of elections.

Backsliding among indicators of democratic stability relevant to public health: Risks in OECD nations

“…Even well‐situated and respected countries, like Denmark and Sweden, experienced declining Civil Liberties scores, likely due to strict COVID‐19 measures. In countries such as Turkey, Hungary, or Poland, where civil liberties have been on the decline for years (Esen & Gumuscu, 2021; Pap, 2017; Repucci, 2020), we see an unsurprising continuation and perhaps even more pronounced decline due to authoritarian COVID‐19 measures and restrictions (Levine, 2021; Stenberg et al, 2022). Aside from the COVID‐19 pandemic, civil liberties in CEE (Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Czech Republic, etc.)…”

“…Such threats include the protection of civil liberties, state‐sanctioned violence, and election integrity. When broader threats to democracy are realized, these indicators affect downstream, traditional measures of democracy relevant to public health—such as welfare state provision of public goods (Greer et al, 2017; Levitsky & Way, 2010; Stenberg et al, 2022). Here, less stable democracies may have incentives for further restriction of public goods for certain groups to concentrate benefits among core supporters, along with tactics to oppress and demobilize pushback against constrained access to these public goods (González, 2020; Lerman & Weaver, 2014; Trounstine, 2008, 2018; Weaver & Prowse, 2020).…”

“…In Austria, amidst the credit blame game the new Austrian People's Party (new ÖVP), led by Chancellor Sebastian Kurz, enjoyed playing throughout the first three waves of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19) pandemic (Falkenbach, 2022); allegations of corruption, bribery, and false statements against Kurz and his inner circle led to Kurz's resignation as Chancellor in October 2021 and indications of democratic backsliding within the country (Falkenbach, 2022). In Hungary and other less stable democracies, new research demonstrates that trends to undermine fair elections accelerated during COVID‐19 (Stenberg et al, 2022).…”

Why Political Scientists Should Study Smaller Cities

“…For example, as part of the dominant party in Hungary's attempts to consolidate power during the COVID-19 pandemic, fiscal transfer rules were altered. Cities with populations under 25,000 would be reimbursed for lost revenue by right, while larger cities, where the opposition is stronger, would only be compensated on a case-by-case basis (Stenberg, Rocco and Farole 2022). In another example, eligibility for federal Community Development Block Grants in the United States is based on city size and/or designation as a principal city in a metropolitan area.…”

Playbook of Subnational Illiberalism: Autocrats face the Opposition-led Local Governments

“…Apart from identifying a playbook of subnational illiberalism, the analysis eventually leads to several observations confirmed by cases from both continents. 1. many of the tactics are enabled by structural (perhaps some of them even inevitable) weaknesses in the accepted norms of local government; 2. crisis situations bringing about previously unavailable pretexts (Stenberg et al 2022;Grogan and Donald 2022) and unlocking exceptional rules of states of emergency (Lührmann and Rooney 2021) may stretch the limits to an extent that ulterior motive of undermining opposition-led local governments become publicly observable. Similar dynamic was observed by Grogan and Donald in a multi-country study of the pandemic and rule of law, stating the pandemic 'had the effect of accelerating pre-existing trends and exposing the true character of regimes', while autocratising states such as Hungary and Turkey in particular, 'seized upon the virus as a pretext to entrench power at the centre ' (2022, 474).…”