How does support for opposition parties grow in dominant party systems? Most scholarship on the rise of competitive elections in dominant party regimes focuses on elite defections from the ruling party and coordination by opposition parties as key explanations, but there is less focus on how politics at the local level contributes to opposition victories. This article argues that effective service delivery in local government helps opposition parties grow support in local elections. Examining the case of the Democratic Alliance (DA) in South Africa, this article provides a systematic analysis of local elections and opposition party performance. Using an original data set of electoral, census and spatial data at the lowest electoral unit in South Africa (the ward), this article shows that in the areas where it is the incumbent party, support for the DA grows as the delivery of basic services to non-white households improves, and when DA-run wards outperform the neighbouring ones run by the ruling African National Congress party, support for the DA increases in neighbouring wards. Overall, this study contributes to our understanding of how local politics erode dominant party rule.
As governments sought to manage the coronavirus pandemic, many pursed temporary increases in centralized authority, a general tactic of crisis management. However, in some countries, public health was not the only motive for centralization. The COVID-19 response coincided with broader worldwide trends toward autocratization. Some of these efforts happened while the world was preoccupied with responding to the pandemic without concretely referencing coronavirus; however, in other cases, public-health rationales are clearly and explicitly invoked as a pretext for actions that instead aid the consolidation of regime authority. This has been especially pernicious in subnational politics, where efforts have been made to undermine the ability of opposition parties to fairly contest local and regional politics. This article examines four cases in which political actors either opportunistically used distraction from the COVID-19 pandemic or explicitly invoked public health while seeking to undermine long-term political contestation in their jurisdictions: Hong Kong, Hungary, Uganda, and the United States. We characterize the use of pandemic response as pretext or opportunity for undermining opposition parties, recentralizing political authority in dominant actors, and inhibiting the fair contestation of elections.
How do weak states in conflict-prone regions of the world manage crisis? This article applies a theory of international organizations as a framework to analyze how states in East Africa cooperated to address the problems associated with state collapse in Somalia. Based on a case study of the InterGovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the study identifies unique factors for why weak states act through security organizations by focusing on the role of changing norms and structural factors. Finally, the article pinpoints factors that undermine the IGAD's ability to live up to its full potential, and offers potential policy remedies.
How do parties historically dominated by one group diversify their representatives? I argue that ethnic parties adjust their strategies according to the institutional rules in place and the demographics of relevant constituencies. I study South Africa, which has a Mixed-Member Proportional electoral system, where parties nominate Single Member District and Proportional Representation candidates. Using original data on the racial, ethnic, and career background of over 10,000 local candidates nominated by the historically white Democratic Alliance party, I find that the party engages in vote-based inclusion by nominating black candidates to predominantly black districts. And while the DA symbolically includes non-whites on its PR lists, white candidates dominate electable list positions. These findings provide a demonstration at the micro-level of why ethnic parties struggle to meaningfully diversify.
As governments sought to manage the Coronavirus pandemic, many pursed a temporary increase in centralized authority, a general tactic of crisis management. However, in some countries, centralization in the name of public health was not the only motive. The COVID-19 response coincided with broader worldwide trends towards democratic backsliding and authoritarian consolidation. Some of these efforts happened while the world was preoccupied with responding to the pandemic without concretely referencing Coronavirus; however, in other cases, public health rationales are clearly and explicitly invoked as a pretext for actions that instead aid the consolidation of regime authority. This has been especially pernicious in subnational democracy, where efforts have been made to undermine the ability of opposition parties to fairly contest in local and regional politics. This paper looks at four cases in which political actors either opportunistically used worldwide distraction from the COVID-19 pandemic or explicitly invoked public health while seeking to undermine long-term domestic contestation in their jurisdictions: Hong Kong, Hungary, Uganda, and the United States. We examine the use of public health as a pretext for undermining opposition parties, recentralizing political authority in dominant actors, and inhibiting the fair contestation of elections.
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