Buying an Income: The Market for Civil Service Positions in Indonesia

Abstract

in indonesia, positions in the Civil Service are subject to hidden market transactions. the demand for stable sources of income is high, and lack of transparency makes sales possible by government officers in core positions. the recent decentralization reforms have blurred borders of responsibility and lines of reporting in the bureaucracy and facilitated increasing rent-seeking at local levels. the article reports from a study of payment for government positions in an urban and a rural district in a province in indonesia, nusa tenggara Barat. the survey reveals that prices for positions are rising and vary among departments in accordance with available opportunities to boost their income. Prices are higher where many projects are available and the compensation is good. the article concludes that current practices are unethical and hurt the society and that increased transparency in employment procedures must be in place before things can get any better.

How corruption diminishes the effectiveness of public spending on education in Indonesia

“…Lambsdorff (2006) lists almost every corruption measure currently available. Quantitative studies of corruption and governance in Indonesia include Sumarto, Arifianto and Suryahadi (2003); Olken (2006aOlken ( , 2006bOlken ( , 2007; Kristiansen and Ramli (2006); Olken and Barron (2007);and Asia Foundation (2008).…”

A cultural constraints theory of police corruption: Understanding the persistence of police corruption in contemporary Indonesia

“…This was helped by a decentralization of state governance to local administrations (Djani, 2009), resulting in greater autonomy for provincial policing (Kristiansen & Trijono, 2005). However, Polri would often abuse their power so it is equally possible that decentralization has opened opportunities for corruption (Kristiansen & Ramli, 2006). Citizens certainly perceive the police as untrustworthy (Meliala, 2002) and as a means of promoting police legitimacy in the eyes of the public.…”

The state and illegality in Indonesia

“…Countless individuals were able to achieve huge increases in their net worth during their working careers by virtue of their success as Suharto franchisees. The strong financial incentives they faced are clearly reflected in the fact that there have always been numerous applicants for positions in the civil service and the military relative to the number of such positions available at any time, and that individuals have always been willing to make under-the-counter payments to the relevant 'gatekeepers' to secure such positions, or to secure promotions and transfers to more lucrative positions once inside the system (Kristiansen and Ramli 2006).…”

“…The implication was that relatively few at the low levels could expect rapid promotion, and yet promotion was the only way to gain access to the more lucrative opportunities for supplementing one's income with special allowances and other top-ups paid from slush funds or derived from participation in corrupt activity. In these circumstances, individuals desirous of promotion had strong incentives to compete with their peers -especially for promotion into positions in the 'wet' areas, where the availability of off-budget funds was greatest (Kristiansen and Ramli 2006).…”