The state and illegality in Indonesia

Aspinall, Edward; Klinken, Gerry van

doi:10.26530/oapen_368290

Cited by 61 publications

(27 citation statements)

References 57 publications

(74 reference statements)

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“…Yet, the particular features of its political system make the analysis of Indonesia interesting beyond the country as such and sets it apart from the cases analyzed so far. It is characterized as highly clientelistic with voters expecting tangible material benefits in exchange for their votes (Mietzner 2011, Aspinall and van Klinken 2011, Aspinall and Sukmajati 2016. Money politics play a large role not only in persuading voters but also for nominating candidates.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

To the ones in need or the ones you need? The political economy of central discretionary grants − empirical evidence from Indonesia

Gonschorek

Schulze

Sjahrir

2018

European Journal of Political Economy

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We analyze the allocation of discretionary grants from the central government to local governments in Indonesia. Using OLS and Fixed Effects models on an unbalanced panel data set for more than 400 Indonesian districts covering the period 2005-2013, we investigate whether the allocation of the grants is determined by the need of a district, by political alignment of the central government with the local district heads, or by reelection motives of the incumbent president. We find that grant allocations are not determined by need characteristics and that political considerations matter significantly. Districts with low support for the president received significantly more than the core supporting districts, especially in the year of national elections. This effect is limited to the first term of the president. In the second term, after which reelection is impossible, political considerations were largely absent. This pattern is consistent with the view that the incumbent president considers discretionary grants as an instrument to increase reelection probabilities. Unlike the evidence for most countries, we find no effect for political party alignment with local district heads. Our results are robust to the inclusion of a number of other variables capturing competing motives.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

To the ones in need or the ones you need? The political economy of central discretionary grants − empirical evidence from Indonesia

Gonschorek

Schulze

Sjahrir

2018

European Journal of Political Economy

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“…The communitarian counter against the individualism of liberal democracy discourse then manifests in the form of various "grey" activities which from the formal and legal perspective may fall into the category of illegal, or informal at best, through which the public articulates the dislocations they cannot inscribe on the surface of the condoned discourse of democracy (Aspinall, 2011). Though informal or illegal, the parallel structures of these shadow state aspects have been able to define the formal political dynamics in the Post-1998 Indonesia and sometimes twist the democratic regime into oligarchy (Robison & Hadiz, 2004).…”

Section: How To Contextually Shape Democratisation: Lesson-learned Frmentioning

confidence: 99%

Contextually-Grounded Democracy: Broadening Pathways for Democratisation

Santoso

Tapiheru²

2017

Power, Conflict and Democracy Journal

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“…Before exploring these problems empirically, I provide a brief account of state formation in Cambodia and the role of natural resources in this process. 23 Heyman and Smart 1999;Anders and Nuijten 2007;Aspinall andvan Klinken 2011. 24 Gellert 2010.…”

Section: The Political Ecology Of State Formationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cambodia's Unofficial Regime of Extraction: Illicit Logging in the Shadow of Transnational Governance and Investment

Milne

2015

Critical Asian Studies

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Cambodia has recently demonstrated one of the highest rates of deforestation in the world. While scholars have long explored the drivers of tropical forest loss, the case of Cambodia offers particular insights into the role of the state where transnational governance and regional integration are increasingly the norm. Given the significant role logging rents play in Cambodia's post-conflict state formation, this article explores the contemporary regime and its ongoing codependent relationship with forested land. Insights are distilled from comparative analysis of illicit logging in two ethnographic case studies. Both involve foreign investments by state-owned companies -a Chinese-backed hydropower dam and Vietnameseowned rubber concessions -and both are nestled in prominent conservation landscapes that are managed with international donor support. Together, the cases reveal how Cambodia's current timber extraction regime works through the use and abuse of legal mechanisms associated with forest conservation and foreign investment projects, and the mobilization of elite alliances that log both for private gain and in service of the ruling party's interests. By implication, the government's remarkable facilitation of transnational projects for conservation and development must be reappraised and ultimately seen as constitutive of a predatory and extractive regime that continues to rely heavily upon illicit logging revenues.

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The state and illegality in Indonesia

Cited by 61 publications

References 57 publications

To the ones in need or the ones you need? The political economy of central discretionary grants − empirical evidence from Indonesia

To the ones in need or the ones you need? The political economy of central discretionary grants − empirical evidence from Indonesia

Contextually-Grounded Democracy: Broadening Pathways for Democratisation

Cambodia's Unofficial Regime of Extraction: Illicit Logging in the Shadow of Transnational Governance and Investment

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